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Abstract 
  
Knowledge has been at the centre of philosophical and scientific enquiry for centuries. It 
remains a topic of central importance in psychology. The current thesis examined how 
knowledge was managed and treated as relevant by speakers in social interaction in situ. 
Complaint calls to a dispute resolution telephone helpline service were studied using 
discursive psychology and conversation analysis as theoretical and methodological 
frameworks. The thesis focused on how knowledge was implicated in the accomplishment of 
the institutional task of jointly establishing the facts of the complaint. In particular, the 
research examined how the issues of ‘who knows what’ and ‘who has the rights to know it’ 
were demonstrably relevant for speakers in these interactions. The empirical work focused on 
two types of question-answer sequences. In cases where some requested information was not 
forthcoming or not immediately provided, callers’ conduct displayed their orientations to a 
normative expectation that they knew what was asked for and that they had an obligation to 
provide it. A second set of cases was a collection of declarative requests for confirmation. 
The different types of responses to such questions were described. It was proposed that the 
responses could be placed along a continuum, by the extent to which they asserted a caller’s 
epistemic rights to knowledge about the relevant information. The thesis contributed to 
existing research by drawing together recent conversation analytic work on epistemics as a 
domain of organization in social interaction, and more established discursive psychological 
work on reality construction. The thesis highlighted the practical nature of knowledge, as it 
was relevant for accomplishing a key institutional task, and other actions, in telephone-
mediated dispute resolution.  
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Introduction and Literature Review  
 
“Socrates: Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction- What is 
knowledge? Can we answer that question?”- Theaetetus, Plato, 360BC (2001). 
 
 Socrates pondered the nature of knowledge; a question that continued to puzzle 
philosophers over the ensuing centuries. Epistemology, or the study of knowledge, has sought 
to explore what we know, and how we know it. Philosophical questions have become topics 
of empirical enquiry. Such was the case with the present thesis, which examined how 
speakers made knowledge relevant for practical purposes in social interaction. The 
philosopher Descartes viewed the mind as a self-enclosed internal entity operating separately 
from the body (Cartesian dualism; Descartes, 1637/1957). Cognitive psychology later 
extended upon Cartesian dualism to investigate the internal psychological processes of the 
mind, especially in regard to knowledge (Prilleltensky, 1994). Knowledge has been defined 
in psychology as an internal cognitive representation of some ‘thing’ and remains a topic of 
central importance (Grimm, 2014).  
 A different way of studying knowledge emerged, and has continued, with the research 
approach of situated cognition. This approach acknowledges that it is not possible to look 
inside the head and observe these internal representations and, as such, it is more productive 
to examine how cognitive matters such as knowledge are distributed within and across 
settings (Grimm, 2014; Hutchins, 1995). Situated cognition conceptualizes knowledge in 
three distinct ways (Robbins & Aydede, 2009). First, the cognitive is embodied. That is, 
matters such as knowledge are constituted through our physical actions. Cognitive matters are 
also embedded within our situated environment and are relevant through our interaction with 
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the environment. Finally, cognitive matters are extended out of the confines of our mind and 
into the wider world (Robbins & Aydede, 2009). The approach of situated cognition 
acknowledges that matters such as knowledge are implicated in and through our interactions 
and behaviour in socially situated environments.  
A prime example of a ‘socially situated’ activity is social interaction between people 
in the form of talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, 1987). Talk-in-interaction is a term that 
recognises that talk occurs in interaction with other semiotic modalities to accomplish 
intersubjective understanding and communication (Schegloff, 2007)1. The current research 
drew inspiration from situated cognition and examined how knowledge was made relevant 
and oriented to by speakers in situated talk-in-interaction (i.e. in situ). The thesis adopted the 
theoretical and methodological frameworks of discursive psychology and conversation 
analysis and examined knowledge as a psychological topic in talk-in-interaction. The 
following sections describe discursive psychology and conversation analysis in more detail 
and situates the research within these approaches. 
Theoretical and methodological framework 
Discursive psychology  
 Discursive psychology originated from the early work of Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
in their book Discourse and Social Psychology, which presented a distinctively qualitative 
approach to the study of social psychology. Discourse and Social Psychology was part of the 
‘discursive turn’, a wider intellectual movement in psychology that promoted an alternative 
to traditional social and cognitive theorising of internal psychological processes to instead 
examine psychological matters in talk and texts (Potter, 2012). Discursive psychology was 
initially a methodological approach itself, examining talk and texts as objects of study in their 
                                                     
1 Semiotic modalities are the various means through which we communicate in interaction. These include, but 
are not limited to, talk, gesture, gaze and body orientation (Goodwin, 2007). 
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own right.  However, over time, it has evolved in different ways, one of which has been as a 
broader framework for the psychological study of social interaction.  
 Discursive psychology studies how speakers orient to and make psychological matters 
and topics relevant in talk-in-interaction (Wiggins & Potter, 2008). Psychological matters are 
examined in three ways in discursive psychology. First, traditional psychological topics are 
respecified for how they are accomplished in interaction (Edwards & Potter, 2005). For 
example, Potter (1998) respecified attitudes as the stances speakers displayed in their talk 
toward some person or ‘thing’. Discursive psychology can also investigate how 
psychological terms, such as “want” (Childs, 2012) and “know” (Weatherall, 2011) are used 
for particular interactional purposes. Finally, discursive psychology can investigate the 
implicit ways that psychological issues figure in social interaction (Edwards & Potter, 2005).  
 Within discursive psychology, language, and especially talk, is considered to be the 
primary vehicle for action and understanding in human social life (Wiggins & Potter, 2008). 
Edwards and Potter (2001) outlined three core assumptions of talk in discursive psychology. 
First, talk is situated within sequences of interaction and generates its meaning in relation to 
these sequences. Talk also accomplishes action. It achieves things in interaction as mundane 
as requesting and complimenting. Finally, talk is constructed from specific linguistic units 
and is constructive of particular versions of reality.  
Discursive psychology is a distinctive approach to studying human behaviour through 
its focus on action and an increasing use of conversation analysis to study social interaction 
in situ. Discursive psychology using conversation analysis examines audio and/or video 
recordings of everyday and institutional interaction as they would naturally occur (Wiggins & 
Potter, 2008). 
 A unique characteristic of discursive psychology using conversation analysis is that it 
takes talk itself as its object of study. Discursive psychology brackets off what goes on in 
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speakers’ heads and instead respecifies cognitive and psychological matters as how they are 
displayed or managed by participants in interaction (Wiggins & Potter, 2008). Psychology 
has typically viewed talk as reflecting what people actually know or think. For example, the 
use of “I don’t know” in talk could be assumed to indicate a person’s lack of knowledge. 
However, in line with a discursive psychological framework, Weatherall (2011) examined a 
particular type of “I don’t know” in talk-in-interaction. Weatherall showed that it was used 
for specific actions, including to mark a speaker’s displayed lack of commitment to what 
came next in a turn. Thus, the focus in discursive psychology is on how psychological 
matters, such as knowledge (or lack thereof), are implicated in practical actions in talk-in-
interaction; for example, to avoid committing to an assessment (Weatherall, 2011). 
The present thesis drew upon discursive psychology as an established framework 
from which to examine the different ways that knowledge could be displayed and managed 
by speakers in talk-in-interaction. In particular, the thesis examined talk-in-interaction in situ 
and respecified knowledge for how it was used for, and implicated in, speakers’ practical 
actions.  
Conversation analysis 
Conversation analysis is a methodology that originated in sociology from the work of 
Harvey Sacks, Emmanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson. It is now used across disciplines as 
diverse as anthropology (Clemente, 2014), linguistics (Fox, Thompson, Ford, & Couper-
Kuhlen, 2014) as well as psychology (Potter & Edwards, 2014). Conversation analysis is 
widely considered to be the most rigorously empirical approach for studying talk-in-
interaction (Potter & Te Molder, 2005).  
The work of the sociologists Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel provided 
conversation analysis with some of its foundational assumptions. Goffman’s work 
contributed to the assumption that social interaction exhibits order and is thus a legitimate 
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object of study (Heritage & Clayman, 2010). Garfinkel’s work was important for the 
conversation analytic focus on the everyday practices that participants use to accomplish 
shared meaning making (Heritage, 1984b). 
 A key assumption in conversation analysis is that everyday conversation represents 
the “primordial site of human sociality” and social order (Schegloff, 1987, p.101). Thus, 
conversation analysis places central importance on everyday interaction. Institutional talk is 
also examined in conversation analysis, with the assumption that everyday conversation 
provides the foundations for how institutional interaction is accomplished (Heritage, 2005)2. 
Conversation analytic research has discovered generic domains of organization in social 
interaction, which are orderly collections of practices and rules that organize a certain aspect 
of talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, 1999). These domains of organization and other 
interactional principles are outlined below because they are relevant for the empirical work of 
the thesis. 
 Organization of talk-in-interaction. In social interaction, talk normatively 
progresses sound-by-sound, unit-by-unit, turn-by-turn and sequence-by-sequence, which is 
the principle of progressivity (Schegloff, 2007). Progressivity is a fundamental feature of 
conversation. It concerns the temporally continuous nature of talk and how talk and 
sequences of action progress forward to completion (Schegloff, 2007). Progressivity 
underpins two domains of organization that structure basic features of social interaction; turn-
taking and sequence organization3. 
 Turn-taking organization. The turn-taking model for everyday conversation 
described by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) documented the practices and rules 
                                                     
2 The conversation analytic approach to institutional interaction is described in chapter two. 
3 Repair is another domain of organization that concerns the practices and rules speakers use to manage 
problems of understanding and production of talk in conversation. Repair is not discussed in this section as it 
was not relevant to the analysis. 
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speakers use in conversation to construct and take turns of talk and to speak at the right time. 
Turns of talk are constructed from various turn constructional units (TCUs). These include 
words (lexical TCUs), phrases (phrasal TCUs) and sentences (sentential TCUs). At or near 
the end of each TCU is a transition-relevant place, where speakership change becomes 
potentially relevant. There are three ways that speakership change can be accomplished in 
conversation; a current speaker can select a next speaker, a current speaker can continue 
speaking, or a next speaker can self-select and begin talking (Sacks et al., 1974).  
 The smooth progression of an interaction occurs when turns of talk proceed and 
speakership change happens without disruption, that is, with no substantial silences or 
overlapping talk (Sacks et al., 1974). In contrast, the progressivity of an interaction can be 
disrupted when turns at talk cease or speakership change is problematic or non-forthcoming 
(Schegloff, 2007). Such breaches can be oriented to as potentially meaningful for speakers.  
 Sequence organization. A basic unit of sequence is the adjacency pair; two 
consecutive turns of talk by different speakers where the first turn launches an action and the 
second turn provides a response (Schegloff, 2007). These first turns are referred to as first-
pair-parts and their answers as second-pair-parts.  Adjacency pair sequences are the basic 
building blocks for accomplishing social actions in talk, such as invitations and requests 
(Schegloff, 2007)4.  
Conditional relevance is a concept crucial to sequence organisation and progressivity. 
It refers to how first-pair-parts make second-pair-parts relevant in order to complete a 
sequence of action (Schegloff, 2007). The failure to provide a conditionally relevant second-
pair-part can be a noticeable and accountable matter for speakers, especially recipients, in 
interaction (Schegloff, 2007). Therefore, sequential progressivity occurs when a 
                                                     
4Sequences can be expanded beyond these base adjacency pairs using various expansion practices (see 
Schegloff, 2007). 
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conditionally relevant second-pair-part is provided. The progression of a sequence can be 
disrupted when a response is not immediately forthcoming or not provided at all. Sequential 
progressivity and the smooth progression of an interaction can be interdependent. For 
example, in the data examined in this thesis, the progression of an interaction could be 
disrupted when some relevant information (a second-pair-part) was not provided. 
 The progression of talk, sequences and the interaction as a whole is the normative 
state of affairs in conversation (Schegloff, 2007). Research has established that there is a 
preference for progressivity in interaction (e.g. Stivers & Robinson, 2006). Preference is 
discussed in detail later, but for now it is sufficient to note that the conversation analytic 
concept of preference does not refer to the psychological preference of speakers. Rather, 
preference is an aspect of the structural and sequential organization of conversation 
(Schegloff, 2007). The preference for progressivity is shown through speakers being mutually 
oriented to it as a normative principle in interaction. For example, silences and overlapping 
talk that breach the preference for progressivity are inspected by speakers in interaction for 
what they might mean (Schegloff, 2007).  
Epistemics in conversation analysis 
 Epistemics is a recently established domain of organization structuring talk-in-
interaction. Conversation analytic research on epistemics has focused on how speakers 
display, claim and manage matters of knowledge in conversation (Heritage, 2014). A central 
notion in this research is that of territories of knowledge; the idea that certain speakers have 
superior access and rights to certain domains of knowledge (Kamio, 1997). Therefore, a 
speaker can treat another as having the primary rights and entitlements to know particular 
‘things’ because this information is within the latter’s epistemic domain (Heritage & 
Raymond, 2005). For example, Edwards (2007a) noted that in the context of telephone 
helpline services, institutional representatives were treated by callers as having primary rights 
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to know the various institutional policies and procedures. Relatedly, callers were treated as 
having primary rights to their own personal feelings, thoughts and experiences. Research on 
epistemics has also aimed to document the various practices used by speakers to manage 
these territories of knowledge in talk (Heritage, 2014).  
 In a landmark study on the ways that epistemic matters are treated as relevant in talk, 
Heritage and Raymond (2005) examined how speakers managed the rights to make an 
assessment. For example, managing who had the right to assess a child’s behaviour. A 
speaker who made a first assessment, because of the nature of its positioning, displayed some 
rights to be able assess the matter at hand. However, sometimes in conversation a speaker 
may not have the primary rights to some matter because the information is from another 
person’s epistemic domain (Heritage, 2014). Heritage and Raymond (2005) documented the 
various practices that respondents who had primary rights to an assessed matter, such as a 
child’s mother, used to re-establish their rights and entitlements despite producing a second 
assessment. Assessments are just one of many actions in conversation where speakers treat 
the issues of ‘who knows what’ and ‘who has the rights to know it’ as relevant. Questioning 
in talk-in-interaction has received perhaps the greatest attention from conversation analytic 
research on epistemics (Heritage, 2012b). Such research has highlighted the importance of 
the concepts of epistemic status and stance. 
 Epistemic status refers to the pre-existing rights of a speaker, as oriented to by others, 
in relation to a particular domain of knowledge (Heritage, 2012a). For example, doctors are 
treated as having primary rights to medical knowledge (Lindström & Weatherall, 2015). 
Epistemic stance relates to how speakers display and claim knowledge in their turns of talk 
(Heritage 2012a). In this thesis, speakers claiming or displaying a higher epistemic stance or 
status are referred to as K+ speakers (i.e. ‘more knowledgeable’). Whereas those claiming or 
displaying a lower epistemic stance or status are referred to as K- speakers. In this thesis, 
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question-answer sequences were studied for how speakers managed epistemic matters and 
because of this the relevant concepts are reviewed below. 
Questions in conversation 
 Questions are formatted in many ways in conversation. Polar questions are those that 
project either “yes” or “no” as a response. They can be formatted as declaratives, as shown in 
1.1 below5,6. 
 (1.1) 
EGCC2015-002 
CON: and the account’s in your name? 
 
Polar questions can also be formatted as interrogatives, which involve the 
grammatical inversion of the subject and auxiliary/verb (Jespersen, 1964), as demonstrated in 
1.2 below7. 
(1.2) 
EGCC2015-001 
CON: have you got you:r um cus:tomer number with bluetower 
 
 Finally, questions can also be formatted as content or “wh-” questions, as shown 
below. 
 
(1.3) 
EGCC2015-017 
CON: .hh and whe:n: did the invoice come.  
 
In all of the above extracts, the question was asked from a K- position. However, 
different question formats can display different epistemic stances of questioners relative to 
respondents, as shown in figure 1.1 below. In the content and interrogative questions, the 
questioner was positioned as claiming relatively little knowledge. In contrast, the declarative 
question positioned the questioner as claiming more knowledge than the “wh-” and 
                                                     
5 Throughout the thesis, the turns of interest in the extracts are indicated in boldface. 
6 The formatting used for the extracts in this thesis is described in Appendix A. The transcription conventions 
used in the extracts are presented in Appendix B. Shorter examples, as in (1.1), are presented without line 
numbers. 
7 It is important to note that polar questions do not invariably make a simple “yes” or “no” relevant as responses. 
For example, in example 1.2, the projected “yes” response would be incomplete as it would not provide the 
information being requested. 
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interrogative format questions. Heritage (2012a) also noted that a question’s design and 
epistemic stance display different epistemic gradients.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The different epistemic gradients of different question formats (Adapted from 
Heritage & Raymond, 2012). 
  
The figure above showed the different epistemic gradients of the different question 
formats. The declarative positioned the questioner as having a relatively equal epistemic 
stance to the recipient, and thus having some degree of rights to the matter at hand. 
Conceptually, the question inferred a relatively shallow epistemic gradient between speakers. 
As such, the declarative question displayed a relative epistemic symmetry between speakers. 
In contrast, the other formats positioned the questioners as having lower epistemic stances to 
the recipients and set up steep epistemic gradients between them. Therefore, the other 
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questions inferred a relative epistemic asymmetry between questioners and recipients. In sum, 
a declarative question presents a description of some matter as shared knowledge, albeit 
within a recipient’s epistemic domain, and confirmation is relevant as a response (Sidnell, 
2012).  
 Questions also contain assumptions (Hayano, 2014). Consider the declarative request 
for confirmation below. 
Extract 1.1: 
EGCC2015-009: 
01 CON:   (and/ehm) [for fifteen ]months you= 
02 CAL:             [U::m        ] 
03 CON:    =were o::n (.) low user 
  
The question displayed the assumption that the recipient was on an electricity plan for 
a certain length of time, “fifteen months” and that it was a “low user” plan. Responses to 
questions accept and/or contest these assumptions, in addition to other constraints and 
preferences imposed on them. 
Preference and responses in conversation 
 A response has multiple constraints and preferences imposed upon it by a prior 
question (Lee, 2014). In the earlier description of preference, it was noted that the concept is 
not a psychological one but a structural one (Schegloff, 2007). Although preferences exist in 
relation to a range of conversational phenomena, the current discussion is restricted to the 
preference organization of responses. First-pair-parts make second-pair-parts relevant, but 
speakers display that some types of responses are prioritised over others (Potter, 1996). A 
preferred response furthers the progression of, or aligns with, the action implemented by a 
first-pair-part (Schegloff, 2007). Examples of preferred responses include accepting an 
invitation and providing information when requested. In contrast, dispreferred responses 
block the realisation of, or do not progress, the actions implemented by first-pair-parts 
(Schegloff, 2007). Dispreferred responses include declining an invitation or not providing 
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some requested information. Preferred responses are usually delivered immediately or shortly 
after a first-pair-part and are simple and to the point, whereas dispreferred responses are often 
characterised by delayed provision, perturbations, accounts and other features that display a 
speaker’s orientation to their dispreferred status (Schegloff, 2007). 
 The various preferences and constraints imposed on a response are primarily the 
result of a question’s design. A first level of preference relates to questions making certain 
types of responses relevant (Schegloff, 2007). Responses should match the action of a first-
pair-part. For example, a request for information makes provision of information relevant as a 
response rather than a greeting. A second level of preference is for a response to conform to 
the format made relevant by the question’s design (Raymond, 2003). For example, a “where” 
question makes a location relevant as an answer and polar questions usually make a simple 
“yes” or “no” relevant as responses.  
Another level of preference that is crucial to the thesis is that polar questions are also 
often designed in such a way that projects the expectation of either “yes” or “no” as a 
response (Raymond, 2003). A positively formulated question prefers “yes” as a response. A 
negatively formulated question, such as “you didn’t…”, prefers a “no” response. Crucially, a 
response to a polar question that matches the grammatical form projected by the first-pair-
part is termed a type-conforming response. Type-conforming responses accept the design, 
action and assumptions of questions and do not treat them as problematic (Raymond, 2003). 
A response that departs from the form projected by the question is termed a non-type-
conforming response (Raymond, 2003). A common example of a non-type-conforming 
response is “I don’t know”, which does not directly answer a question (i.e. a non-answer) but 
also provides a displayed lack of knowledge as an account for why the relevant response was 
not given (Beach & Metzger, 1997; Schegloff, 2007).  
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A final preference operating on a response is for the answer to agree with the claim 
contained in the question (Sacks, 1987). The discussion of response formats and preferences 
is necessary to situate the analysis in chapter five. Specifically, it is important to highlight 
that a declarative request for confirmation makes confirmation, in the form of either “yes” or 
“no” as a type-conforming response, relevant as a second-pair-part. 
 A non-type-conforming response contests the design, action and assumptions (i.e. 
different aspects) of a polar question. Previous research has referred to such responses as 
“pushing back” on, or “resisting” parts of questions. However, in this thesis, these responses 
are referred to as adjusting aspects of questions. As an example, Stivers and Hayashi (2010) 
identified the practice of transformative answers as a way of adjusting the design of a prior 
question. A transformative answer was a non-type-conforming response that transformed a 
prior question in some way. For example, in one of their cases, a speaker asked “is Boston 
close from New York”, to which a recipient answered, “…it’s about four hours by car” 
(extract five, p.5.). Stivers and Hayashi argued that such an answer retrospectively 
transformed the question as asking about absolute distance between the cities rather than 
relative closeness. 
Conversation analytic research has shown that epistemic matters are relevant for 
speakers in question-answer sequences. Such research has not usually focused on responses 
to specific types of questions. Rather, it has examined how responses to a range of questions 
manage epistemic matters (e.g. Stivers, 2005; Stivers & Hayashi, 2010). A relative gap exists 
in the literature as to how epistemic matters are managed in declarative question-answer 
sequences, where speakers’ epistemic stances are relatively equal. Discursive psychology has 
approached knowledge and epistemic matters in a different manner, focusing on how 
speakers construct versions of reality in talk. 
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Reality construction in discursive psychology 
One way that discursive psychology has studied epistemic matters is through reality 
construction. Potter’s (1996) work documented the different ways that descriptions were used 
by speakers to construct various versions of reality in talk-in-interaction. Descriptions are 
used in the service of actions, such as to construct some matter as a complaint. One way that 
speakers do this is by using extreme case formulations; descriptions such as “never” or 
“always” that construct the extreme nature of something (Pomerantz, 1986). Extreme case 
formulations can describe a matter in ‘extreme’ negative terms and thus work some issue up 
as legitimate enough to complaint about (Pomerantz, 1986). Epistemic matters are implicated 
in descriptions and reality construction in several ways, including who is entitled to particular 
types of knowledge.  
One notion from discursive psychology is that of category entitlements; the idea that 
speakers treat others as being entitled to know certain information, feel certain emotions and 
have access to certain experiences, based on their memberships of particular social categories 
(Potter, 1996). The notion of category entitlements closely parallels the conversation analytic 
concepts of territories of knowledge and epistemic status. Speakers can invoke or infer these 
entitlements in conversation as a way of legitimising their descriptions as ‘true’.  
 Discursive psychology has also examined the rhetorical practices speakers use to 
construct a version of reality as factual or objective (Edwards, 2007b). For example, a 
speaker can present corroborating evidence from another person in order to work up the 
objectivity of a complaint (Potter, 1996). Furthermore, discursive psychology has 
documented the ways that speakers construct particularly ‘interested’ versions of reality. In 
other words, research has focused on how speakers display or manage their subjective stances 
towards some matter (Edwards, 2005). With regards to complaining, Drew (1998) noted that 
speakers could explicitly describe their ‘negative affect’ in order to work up the significance 
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and complainability of another person’s conduct toward them. By displaying a negative 
stance toward the matter, speakers make their versions of reality recognizable as complaints.  
Reality construction is central to complaining as an action in conversation. 
Complaining in talk-in-interaction is a moral action involving a speaker displaying a negative 
stance toward some complaint object, which can be a human or other entity (Edwards, 2005; 
Heinemann & Traverso, 2009).  At its core, complaining involves speakers describing and 
constructing their complaints as negative versions of reality. Complaining was an action 
central to the interactions examined in this thesis.  
The present thesis 
The empirical work of the thesis drew upon conversation analysis and discursive 
psychology and examined how knowledge was managed and oriented to by speakers in calls 
to a dispute resolution helpline service. These calls involved members of the public (callers) 
contacting institutional representatives (conciliators) to complain about their electricity and 
gas service provision. Callers and conciliators displayed their orientations to the purpose of 
these calls as being to complain and seek a resolution.  
In order to complain, callers described and constructed a negative version of reality to 
conciliators. A caller had the epistemic rights to, or K+ status over, the details of their 
problem8. The conciliator questioned the caller to establish the facts of the matter that were 
relevant for dispute resolution purposes. As such, the conciliator had K+ status over a 
different domain; the institutional requirements that had to be satisfied in order for the 
problem to be treated as a legitimate complaint. In questioning callers over some matters and 
                                                     
8 Throughout this thesis, ‘they’, ‘their’ and ‘them’ are used rather than ‘his’, ‘her’ or ‘his/her’ to refer to 
speakers of either sex in the singular or plural. Specifically, these terms are used when referring to singular 
specific callers (or conciliators), as well as singular callers in general (or conciliators). This stylistic decision 
was made to be consistent with the conversation analytic assumption that identities, such as gender, are only 
relevant if speakers orient to them as such. In contrast, in the interactions examined in this thesis, the identities 
of caller and conciliator were demonstrably relevant to the speakers (Heritage, 2005). 
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not others, conciliators further shaped and constructed an ‘official’ version of reality. 
Agreement from the caller about the official version of the complaint was needed for the 
process of dispute resolution to progress. Thus, these interactions involved a jointly 
accomplished construction of reality. 
 The analytic work reported in this thesis focused on two types of question-answer 
sequences where the facts of the complaint were jointly established and constructed as an 
official version of reality. Some normative dimensions of knowledge were found by 
examining request for information sequences. In declarative request for confirmation 
sequences, I documented the response formats used by callers and what they made visible 
about the epistemic rights of, and gradients between, speakers. In sum, the thesis showed that 
knowledge was central to the form of social interaction examined. Further, the research 
identified the various practices that callers and conciliators used to display and manage 
epistemic matters in their interactions in two specific types of question-answer sequences. 
Thesis overview 
The present chapter has outlined the theoretical and methodological frameworks of 
discursive psychology and conversation analysis. It has also reviewed how knowledge has 
been studied in these approaches, by highlighting research on epistemics and reality 
construction. The next chapter describes the interactional setting from where the data came. It 
also describes the conversation analytic approach to institutional interaction. Chapter three 
presents the methodology. Chapters four and five present the empirical work and findings of 
the thesis. The thesis concludes with a discussion of how the findings contribute to wider 
research. 
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2 
 
The Electricity and Gas Complaints Commissioner Scheme and 
Institutional Talk 
 
 The research examined audio recordings of calls to the Electricity and Gas 
Complaints Commissioner Scheme (EGCC), which is a telephone-mediated dispute 
resolution helpline service. This chapter describes the setting and the approach of institutional 
conversation analysis. Relevant research on telephone-mediated helpline services and dispute 
resolution is also briefly reviewed.  
The Electricity and Gas Complaints Commissioner Scheme 
 The EGCC was established in 2001 as an independent and neutral dispute resolution 
service that the New Zealand public can freely access to resolve disputes with their electricity 
and gas providers (Electricity and Gas Complaints Commissioner Scheme [EGCC], 2014). 
The EGCC is independent because it is a separate entity from the electricity industry and 
neutral, as it does not advocate directly for either customers or providers (EGCC, 2014). 
Every electricity and gas provider in New Zealand is legally required to register as a member 
of the scheme. A board of directors oversees the organization and the Commissioner. The 
latter oversees the employees of the Commission, including conciliators (EGCC, 2014). The 
primary way that the public access the EGCC is through its telephone helpline service.  
 Callers first contact the helpline service with their complaints or enquiries. An issue 
that the conciliator call-takers must establish in these initial calls is whether the complaint 
qualifies as a dispute to be investigated. A complaint must satisfy a variety of requirements in 
order to qualify for EGCC jurisdiction and then be able to be investigated by a conciliator. 
One requirement is that a caller first needs to have attempted to resolve the complaint with 
their provider. If 20 working days have passed since a caller’s initial contact with their 
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provider and the complaint has not been resolved, then the EGCC can investigate the issue 
further (EGCC, 2014). Another practical task that must be jointly accomplished by speakers 
is to establish the facts of the complaint. Once it has been established that the complaint 
qualifies for EGCC jurisdiction, conciliators investigate the issue further. The investigation 
process includes, amongst other things, contacting and gathering further details from the 
caller’s electricity provider. Resolution of the complaint is then attempted through various 
forms of dispute resolution between the interested parties. If no resolution is reached, the 
Commissioner can make a recommendation, which can be accepted by the disputants or 
taken to another legislative service such as the district court (EGCC, 2014).  
Institutional talk in conversation analysis 
 The EGCC is an organization that offers a service and its conciliators have specific 
responsibilities and must complete certain institutional tasks. As such, it can be viewed as a 
particular institutional setting. Conversation analysis takes a distinctive approach to studying 
institutions, by viewing them as produced and oriented to by speakers in interaction 
(Schegloff, 1997b). In other words, the conversation analytic perspective is that institutions 
are ‘talked into being’ by speakers (Heritage & Clayman, 2010).  
 Institutional conversation analysis involves the application of findings and knowledge 
from research on ordinary conversation to understand institutional interaction and how it may 
differ from its mundane counterpart (Drew & Heritage, 1992)9. Heritage and Clayman (2010) 
noted three features that distinguish institutional talk from everyday conversation. First, 
speakers enact various institutional identities that are oriented towards achieving particular 
interactional goals. For example, speakers enacted the identity of conciliator by working 
towards accomplishing specific tasks, such as establishing whether a complaint satisfied 
                                                     
9 However, this link is also reciprocal, as research on institutional talk also contributes to an understanding of 
everyday conversation. 
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institutional jurisdiction. Second, in institutional interaction there are limits on what speakers 
can do in the interaction. In these interactions, only a conciliator could, and did, explicitly 
inform a caller of the institution’s various functions and guidelines. Third, the interaction 
makes sense for participants because it occurs within an inferential framework that is tied to 
the particular setting. For example, callers and conciliators interacted within an inferential 
framework that allowed them to understand the calls as serving the purpose of complaining 
and attempting to gain some form of resolution.  
Telephone-mediated helpline services and dispute resolution 
 The calls examined in this thesis were a form of technologically mediated interaction 
(i.e. occurring over the telephone). Callers and conciliators were engaged in telephone-
mediated interaction, a uni-modal form of communication because only talk was involved 
(Hopper, 1992). In contrast to other forms of talk-in-interaction, in telephone calls both 
speakers are not together in the same situated environment and thus do not have visual access 
to one another (non-co-present interaction).  
 Telephone helplines are an important medium for people to do business and access 
customer services (Baker, Emmison, & Firth, 2005). Discursive psychology and conversation 
analysis have examined helplines offering services as diverse as counselling (Emmison & 
Danby, 2007) and birthing advice (Shaw & Kitzinger, 2007). Such research has provided a 
systematic understanding of many matters, including how various institutional tasks are 
accomplished, and how representatives enact the principles and policies of their particular 
institution in interaction (Edwards, 2007a).  
 Discursive psychology and conversation analysis have also provided an extensive 
understanding of how epistemic matters are relevant for speakers in helpline interactions. The 
tasks and activities done in helpline interactions can require callers to provide call-takers with 
descriptions of versions of reality. These are often consequential for institutional tasks to be 
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successfully accomplished. For example, Whalen and Zimmerman (1990) showed that the 
way descriptions were used to construct a version of an ‘emergency’ were crucial for the 
effective provision of lifesaving assistance in calls to emergency services. The current 
research also documented how speakers managed epistemic matters, descriptions and reality 
construction in their interactions. 
 Telephone helpline interactions can be characterized by an epistemic asymmetry, 
whereby each speaker is treated as having different rights and entitlements to different 
domains of knowledge (Edwards, 2007a). Institutional call-takers are treated as K+ speakers 
vis-à-vis the processes and guidelines of their particular institutions. Callers are treated as 
having primary rights over their own experiences and issues. As with the institutional setting, 
this epistemic asymmetry is not a pre-existing entity that affects the interaction. Rather, 
speakers orient to it as relevant in and for their interaction (Heritage & Clayman, 2010). 
Speakers can use various practices to manage this epistemic asymmetry in helpline 
interactions. For example, call-takers at a child helpline packaged advice in a question 
format, such as through “do you think you could talk to Maria?” (Butler, Potter, Danby, 
Emmison, & Hepburn, 2010). The question format managed the call-takers’ rights to provide 
advice whilst still displaying their orientation to the callers’ rights to their own issues and 
experiences. Understanding the ways that speakers negotiated their rights and responsibilities 
to knowledge was a key component of the empirical work of this thesis. 
Telephone-mediated dispute resolution services, such as the EGCC, have only 
recently been studied despite their importance and frequent usage10. In calls to a helpline 
service for neighbour disputes, Stokoe (2009) investigated how callers used identity 
categories, such as age, in order to upgrade the complainability of their disputes. Similarly, 
this thesis also documented the practices that callers used to work up the complainability of 
                                                     
10 As an example, the EGCC handled 4,401 enquiries in 2014-2015 (EGCC, 2015).  
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their issues. Weatherall and Stubbe (2015) investigated the display and management of 
emotion in dispute resolution helpline services. It was found that when callers displayed 
emotion in the interactions, conciliators did not respond to the emotional aspects of the talk 
and instead moved to introduce other relevant institutional tasks. Weatherall (2015) examined 
the various ways that a dispute resolution helpline service’s policy of neutrality was produced 
in interaction. One way this was done was through conciliators reading a pre-prepared 
statement of the organization’s function in response to parts of callers’ complaints that sought 
an affiliative response11. Previous research approaches have focused on theoretical models of 
what occurs in dispute resolution interactions (Glenn & Kuttner, 2013). In contrast, the 
research outlined above has focused on how dispute resolution is done in situ.  
Chapter overview 
 The current chapter has described the institutional setting examined in the thesis. 
Further, this chapter has situated the thesis within existing research on telephone helpline 
services and dispute resolution. The analytic work contributed to the emerging literature base 
on telephone-mediated dispute resolution and extended upon it by demonstrating how 
epistemic matters and reality construction were implicated in practical actions in telephone-
mediated dispute resolution. The following chapter describes how the methodological 
approach was carried out in practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                     
11 An affiliative response is one that supports the stance of a prior turn (Stivers, 2008).  
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3 
 
Methodology 
 
 The introductory chapter situated the thesis within discursive psychology and 
conversation analysis. The current chapter extends that discussion and describes how 
conversation analytic research is carried out in practice. It also provides details about the data 
and outlines how the analytic work was done.  
Conversation analysis in practice 
Data and transcription 
 Conversation analysis studies audio and video recordings of social interaction in situ. 
The use of recordings is a fundamental methodological feature of conversation analysis. It 
provides a physical record of the interaction that can be reinspected and replayed (Sacks, 
1992), which alongside the sharing of the recordings amongst other researchers means that 
the validity of analytic claims can be checked against the raw data (Peräkylä, 2011).  
 Once the recorded interactions have been obtained, they are then transcribed using the 
Jeffersonian transcription system (Jefferson, 2004), which is considerably more detailed than 
the orthographic style typically used in interview research. Conversation analytic 
transcription is premised on the assumption that any level of detail is potentially 
consequential for how talk-in-interaction is accomplished (Mondada, 2007). Accordingly, 
conversation analytic transcripts capture the minutiae of talk including silences, pace and 
overlapping talk. Such a level of detail is not incidental. Rather, it reflects what participants 
may orient to as relevant (Mondada, 2007). For example, it has been shown that speakers that 
launch an invitation can orient to silences as short as two-tenths of a second as projecting a 
possible declination (Schegloff, 2007). Conversation analysis views the recorded interactions 
as the data and the transcripts as representations aiding in the analytic process (Mondada, 
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2007). Transcription is the first step in the analytic process and it is where potential 
phenomena are initially observed. 
Analytic process 
 Conversation analysis is an inductive methodological approach that avoids the 
formulation of a priori research questions and hypotheses (Heritage & Clayman, 2010). The 
aim is to study talk-in-interaction through an “unmotivated examination” of the data 
(Schegloff, 1996, p. 172). The analytic process initially takes the form of repeated listening 
to, and viewings of, individual recordings alongside a close reading of the accompanying 
transcripts. Analysts undertake this process alone as well as in group data sessions with other 
researchers. During this process, an analyst identifies what participants are doing with their 
talk (Sidnell, 2014), with the goal being to establish the practices used to accomplish various 
social actions. 
 Participant orientations. Conversation analysis aims to identify, describe and make 
qualitative claims about normative interactional practices (Sidnell, 2014). As a result, 
conversation analytic research has tended to avoid the use of quantification and coding. This 
rejection of quantification and coding is based on the argument that it results in the 
aggregation of complex conversational practices to discrete categories and the loss of the rich 
interactional detail provided by a close conversational analysis (e.g. Schegloff, 1993). 
However, Stivers (2015) has argued that quantification and coding are appropriate, if used in 
adherence to the inductive principles of conversation analysis. Coding was avoided in this 
research and quantification was only used to calculate the number of cases in particular 
collections.   
Conversation analysis has a participant-driven focus; studying what participants 
display as relevant in their talk (Heritage & Clayman, 2010). This grounded and participant-
driven focus sets conversation analysis apart from some types of qualitative analysis that can 
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involve an analyst’s interpretation of what is occurring and the imposition onto the data of a 
priori categories generated by the researcher (Schegloff, 1997b). 
 The next turn proof procedure is a methodological tool that allows analysts to 
identify what speakers orient to as relevant. It enables the analyst to make claims about “why 
that now?” (Schegloff, 1980, p. 147). In any episode of talk-in-interaction, speakers establish 
an understanding of why something is being done at a particular point in the interaction (i.e. 
why is that occurring now?).  The next turn proof procedure is premised on the observation 
that in their responses (i.e. the next turn), speakers display what they understand the action of 
a prior turn to be (Sacks et al., 1974). The extract below is taken from one of the calls 
collected for the thesis and is used to show how the next turn proof procedure can be utilised 
in conversation analysis. 
Extract 3.1: 
EGCC2015-001: 
01 CON:    mch .hh have you got you:r um cus:tomer 
02         number with blue[tower] 
03 CAL:                    [.hhhh] 
04         (0.8) 
05 CAL:    uh yes I can ge:t that 
 
The conciliator’s turn at line one was a question. However, the relevant action was a 
request. The evidence that the conciliator was making a request (as opposed to asking a 
question) was shown in the next turn, when the caller displayed their understanding of the 
turn as a request. The next turn proof procedure provides data internal evidence for any 
analytic claims that are made. Furthermore, it allows an analyst to ground those claims in 
participants’ displayed understandings in situ. 
 Collection building. Conversation analysts utilise two primary methods to do their 
research and generate findings; single case analysis and building collections of phenomena.  
The present research employed the latter approach. Collections are assembled from corpora 
of recorded interactions. As each interaction in a corpus is examined, analysts may begin to 
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notice certain features and practices that recur across interactions. For example, Schegloff 
(1996) noticed that speakers would agree with another by repeating a prior turn. 
Alternatively, analysts may become interested in how certain actions, such as complimenting, 
are accomplished in interaction. With either approach, researchers collect as many cases as 
possible that appear to resemble the phenomenon of interest (Schegloff, 1996). During this 
process, researchers formulate a general description of what constitutes a candidate case of 
the phenomenon (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008). The description should take into account the 
phenomenon’s positioning (within a turn or sequence), its linguistic composition and the 
action it accomplishes. As an example, the practice collected by Schegloff (1996) was 
described as a second turn in a sequence (the positioning), and that this turn was a verbatim 
repeat of the first (the composition). It was shown that one action accomplished by this 
practice was to confirm something that had been alluded to previously.  
An aim of collection building is to ensure the generalizability of the phenomenon by 
showing that it occurs across a number of interactions in a corpus and across different forms 
of talk-in-interaction (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008). In other words, the goal of this process is 
to show that the phenomenon is not unique to a speaker or an interactional setting. 
Assembling a collection involves the analyst constantly comparing cases to each other, to see 
if they fit the description of a candidate case. Boundary cases are those that appear to be 
similar to the phenomenon of interest yet differ in some way (Schegloff, 1997a). These cases 
are important in delimiting the definition of what constitutes a candidate case and are 
ultimately excluded from the collection.  
 Some candidate cases that are included in the collection might depart in some way 
from the general functions of others in the collection (Peräkylä, 2011). These are deviant 
cases and are important for the analysis in two ways. First, these cases can provide support 
for the normative function of a phenomenon by showing instances of where this is violated 
 
 
 
26 
 
(Peräkylä, 2011). A clear example would be in a question-answer sequence, when the 
requisite answer is not provided and the question is repeated in the pursuit of a response 
(Schegloff, 2007). The pursuit of the response would provide further support for the claim 
about the normative preference for an answer to a question. Second, deviant cases can force a 
re-think of an analytic argument. In a classic example, Schegloff (1968) collected around 500 
cases of telephone call openings and formed the initial argument that the “answerer speaks 
first” (p.1076).  However, a single deviant case was found where a caller spoke first and thus 
the initial argument was reformulated to show how the summons-answer sequence governed 
call openings. Deviant case analysis provides a valuable way for researchers to establish the 
validity of their findings (Peräkylä, 2011).   
 The final product of this process is a collection of cases of an interactional practice 
accomplishing some social action with a detailed description of its composition, position and 
other relevant features (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008). Conversation analysis uses collections to 
build a solid empirical knowledge base of how social interaction is structured and 
accomplished. The following section outlines the research undertaken for this thesis. The 
collections that formed the basis of the empirical work are also described.  
Research procedure  
Ethics and preliminary consultations 
Ethical approval to undertake the research was granted by the Victoria University of 
Wellington School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee. Following this approval, 
preliminary consultations were undertaken with the Commissioner and Deputy 
Commissioner of the EGCC, in which their concerns and the practicalities of the research 
were addressed. Upon the EGCC granting approval, conciliators were informed of the 
project. Any conciliator who wished to participate in the study signed a consent form 
(attached in Appendix C). Participation was voluntary and conciliators could leave the study 
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at any point. Two brief site visits were undertaken prior to data collection, to gain a basic 
understanding of the function of the EGCC and the dispute resolution process.  
Data  
 A corpus of 21 calls was collected for the thesis. The corpus included incoming calls 
to the helpline and outgoing calls made by conciliators. The corpus totalled 325 minutes of 
recorded interaction, with an average call lasting around 15 minutes. The size of the corpus 
was large enough to ensure that any single phenomenon of interest would recur frequently 
enough across interactions. Furthermore, the number of calls resulted in a manageable 
amount of transcription. 
 The thesis also utilised existing data that was collected for previous studies. The 
existing data was collected under the ethical approval of prior research and access was 
provided by my supervisor. The first existing corpus was comprised of 42 calls to the EGCC 
that were recorded in 2008 and were collected by Weatherall and Stubbe (2015). A corpus of 
120 calls collected in 2011 from a similar Australian institution, the Electricity and Water 
Ombudsman of Victoria (EWOV), was also accessed. EWOV is the dispute resolution 
service for the energy and water industries in the Australian state of Victoria (see Dewar, 
2011 for a full description). Both organizations are broadly comparable in their function and 
the types of issues they have jurisdiction over.  
Recording calls 
During the data collection period, a conciliator’s workstation consisted of a desk, 
personal computer and desktop phone with an attached headset through which calls were 
taken. All participating conciliators were provided with telephone-recording adaptors to 
record their calls.  The free online software programme Audacity was loaded onto 
conciliators’ computers to create audio recordings of the calls. Calls were recorded from 
conciliators’ telephones through the adaptor and into an audio file on the computer. 
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 Conciliators were asked to record incoming and outgoing calls. The conciliators had 
to obtain verbal consent from callers for their calls to be recorded at the beginning or end of 
the conversation. If consent was obtained, the conciliator continued recording and saved the 
call as a digital file onto the computer. However, if consent was not obtained, the conciliator 
stopped recording and deleted any trace of the call from the computer. Calls were collected 
from the organization on a regular basis using a secure portable storage device. Recordings 
were stored in password-protected folders on a secure network server at Victoria University 
of Wellington.  
Transcription and analysis 
Calls were transcribed in Microsoft Word documents using the Jeffersonian 
conventions standard in conversation analytic research. Any identifying information uttered 
by speakers was removed from the audio recordings and replaced with white noise. 
Furthermore, pseudonyms were used in the transcripts for the purposes of anonymization. 
 In line with the inductive approach of conversation analysis, no specific research 
questions or hypotheses were formulated for this project. However, it would be naïve to state 
that the analysis was not influenced by my pre-existing knowledge of discursive psychology 
and conversation analysis. I attempted instead to approach the data with an open analytic 
mindset and was not interested beforehand in examining a particular feature of interaction.        
The analytic process closely reflected what has been described throughout this 
chapter. I made extensive analytic notes whilst listening to the recordings, with an aim to 
identify phenomena that recurred across calls. Group data sessions with other researchers 
were also undertaken and were valuable for further developing and refining my analysis. The 
following section describes the collections that were built from these initial analytic 
observations. 
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Analytic focus 
I compiled four collections of different phenomena based on my extensive analytic 
notes. However, only two of these collections are the focus of the forthcoming analysis. 
Cases were first collected from the corpora of EGCC calls. However, some cases from the 
EWOV corpus were also collected in order to increase the size of the collections and to 
further establish the generalizability of the phenomena. 
Collection One: Disruptions to progressivity 
 On the whole, the calls examined progressed smoothly. However, sometimes 
observable disruptions to the progression of an interaction occurred. In some instances, 
callers used expressions such as “wait a second” and “hold on a minute” and accountings or 
informings, such as “I’ll get this out”, to anticipate some breach in the progression of the 
interaction. The first collection was formed from cases of these disruptions. 
56 cases were initially collected and analysed. It was found that half of the cases 
occurred in response to requests for information initiated by the conciliator. An analysis of 
these cases is presented in chapter four.  
Collection Two: Declarative request for confirmation sequences 
 A fundamental institutional task was for speakers to establish a joint understanding of 
the facts of the complaint. These facts could include details as diverse as a caller’s personal 
details and what actions had already been taken towards resolving the problem. One way the 
facts were established was through question-answer sequences. A key way that conciliators 
questioned callers was by using declarative requests for confirmation. 
 Declarative questions were formulated as grammatically complete statements. These 
questions presented some assumed, inferred or previously provided information for callers to 
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confirm. Cases with tag questions or involving other-initiations of repair were not included12. 
Cases were only included if the response treated the question as a request for confirmation.  
 The extract below is presented to show a typical case that became the focus of the 
second collection. 
Extract 3.2: 
EGCC2015-002: 
01 CON:  thu:h meter was insta:lled tenth of march? 
02       (0.3) 
03 CAL:   yup. 
  
In extract 3.2, a detail of the complaint, the date a meter was installed, was jointly 
established by the caller giving a confirming response to the conciliator’s question. 78 cases 
of conciliators’ declarative requests for confirmation and callers’ responses were collected.  
“So” or “and” prefaces were a regular feature of the collected questions. “So” 
prefacing often marked an assumption within a question as being an upshot or inference of 
some prior talk (Heritage & Watson, 1979; Raymond, 2004). “And” prefacing displayed that 
the following declarative was part of a series of questions geared toward accomplishing some 
action, or that it was a follow up to a previous answer (Heritage & Sorjonen, 1994).  
The analysis mapped out the different response formats and the actions they 
accomplished. In particular, the extent to which each type of response asserted a caller’s 
epistemic rights and entitlements to the matter at hand was documented. 
One type of response became an analytic focus. An example is shown in the extract 
below. 
Extract 3.3:  
EGCC2008-MARY4Q: 
01 CON:   =ºokayº (0.2) righty oh and you’ve got a hundred and  
02        thirty odd dollar [bill now.] 
03 CAL:                     [   .hhh  ] hundred and thirty one  
04        forty one 
                                                     
12 Tag questions are short questions attached to the end of turns. For example, “is that right?” or “correct?” 
Other-initiations of repair involve a speaker requesting confirmation in a responsive turn for the purpose of 
correcting a misunderstanding. 
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 The response adjusted the approximation of a power bill’s size in the prior question 
by further specifying its amount. Such responses were termed adjusting answers and were 
defined as those that adjusted some aspect of the prior question (e.g. the design or the 
assumptions). Adjusting answers were non-type-conforming responses to declarative requests 
for confirmation. As such, adjusting answers did not conform to the “yes” or “no” format 
projected by the question (Raymond, 2003). Non-answers such as “I don’t know” and “I 
don’t remember” were not included, along with any response that included a type-conforming 
token (“yes” or “no”).  
Chapter overview 
The present chapter described the methodological approach of conversation analysis. 
It also explained how the data was collected and outlined the process that resulted in the 
collections that are analysed in the following chapters. The cases presented in the analytic 
chapters were selected as the clearest examples and because they were representative of the 
other instances in the collection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
4 
Expectations and obligations: Normative dimensions of 
knowledge. 
 A crucial institutional task in the calls examined was for callers and conciliators to 
jointly establish the facts of the complaint for dispute resolution purposes. The current 
chapter examines request for information sequences as one place in the calls where this task 
was accomplished. These sequences involved conciliators requesting some information about 
the complaint from callers.  
In requesting information, conciliators displayed their entitlement to ask such a 
question and displayed an expectation that callers would answer the question (Heritage & 
Raymond, 2012). The questions placed a normative pressure on callers to provide the 
requested information. On the whole, callers provided the information expected from them. 
When this occurred, the question-answer sequence and the interaction progressed. In contrast, 
the present chapter focuses on cases where some requested information was not immediately 
provided by callers. As a result, the relevance of a response was not satisfied and the 
progression of the interaction was disrupted.  
The following analysis is structured around the different ways that callers worked to 
find and retrieve the information. The cases demonstrate that callers treated it as their 
normative obligation to provide information when it was requested.  
Analysis 
One way that callers found and retrieved some requested information was through 
what Levinson (1983) termed a temporary interactional exit. These involved callers 
temporarily leaving the interaction, to find some information, and then resuming it shortly 
after. In these cases, expressions such as “hold on a second” anticipated a disruption to the 
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progressivity of the interaction. They also functioned to initiate the temporary interactional 
exit. 
 Extract 4.1 shows the typical sequential environment where such expressions were 
used; after the conciliator asked for some specific information. In this case, the caller first 
displayed some uncertainty as to whether they had the requested information, before moving 
to find it.   
Extract 4.1: 
EWOV-242010: 
01 CON:  okay. .hh so on that bill is there an  
02       actual supply:, (.) period? 
03       (1.5) 
04 CAL:  u::m (0.5) I don’t (0.2) thi:nk so ◦uh◦ can I check= 
05       =can you [bear with me for a (    ) (please)] 
06 CON:           [    sure           yeah    yep.   ]  
07       (1.4) 
08       ((receiver possibly down)) 
09       ((52.5 seconds of rustling, noise from television in     
10       background, interspersed typing and possible  
11       interference with receiver)) 
12 CAL:  hhello? 
13 CON:  yes:. 
14 CAL:  .hhh u::::m: well- (#mmghm# um) twenty second (of)  
15       October two thousand and eight? 
The question at line one requested confirmation that the information was on the bill.  
In conversation analysis, what a turn of talk is doing is established by the next turn proof 
procedure, where evidence of the action is found in what a speaker does in the next turn 
(Sidnell, 2014). In this case, the subsequent talk, “can I check?”, demonstrated that the caller 
treated the question as a request for information. 
The first part of the response, “I don’t think so”, was a non-answer because it 
responded to, but did not answer, the question. The non-answer marked a displayed lack of 
certainty from the caller. Further, it accounted for the caller not having immediately provided 
the requested information (Heritage, 1984b). The talk positioned the caller as having a lower 
epistemic stance, relatively K-, than was anticipated by the question.  
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The displayed lack of certainty breached a normative expectation within the question, 
that the caller should know or have the requested information. Heritage (2012a) noted that the 
epistemic stance displayed in a turn of talk often matched, or was congruent with, a speaker’s 
epistemic status. In this case, the opposite occurred, in an example of epistemic 
incongruency, whereby the caller’s relatively low epistemic stance did not match their higher 
epistemic status over the matter (Heritage, 2012a).  
 The request, “can I check”, displayed that the caller was going to move to find the 
requested information and that their previous answer was being treated as insufficient. In 
moving to find the “actual supply period”, the caller displayed an orientation to a normative 
dimension of the question; that they were obligated to provide the information.  
The turn, “can you bear with me for a…”, was formatted as a request for permission. 
Curl and Drew (2008) studied the format of requests in relation to the entitlements to make 
them, and the contingencies associated with them being granted. It was found that requests 
formatted as “can/could you…”, such as above, displayed that speakers were entitled to make 
the request and that it was expected to be granted. In this case, the caller’s entitlement to 
make the request can be understood as arising from their obligation to provide the 
information. Furthermore, the “bear with…” portion, displayed that the caller was treating the 
temporary interactional exit as a possible inconvenience to the conciliator. The request 
marked an upcoming disruption to the conversation and initiated the temporary interactional 
exit.  
 By initiating a temporary interactional exit, the caller displayed that physically 
finding the “supply period” was being treated as incompatible with, and taking priority over, 
their continued verbal engagement in the call. Furthermore, it was understandable to the 
conciliator that the caller was going to some length to provide the requested information.  
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The interaction was suspended for around 52 seconds as the caller presumably made 
the effort to retrieve the information. Verbal engagement in the conversation was jointly re-
established (lines 12 and 13). Despite almost a minute having passed, the date provided (lines 
13 and 14) was understood by the conciliator as representing the “actual supply period” 
requested in the initial question. As the requested information had been provided, the 
interaction was able to be further progressed (not shown in extract). 
 The next case is presented as an example of a caller treating confirmation of having 
some information as making relevant their obligation to provide it.  
Extract 4.2 
EGCC2015-010: 
01 CON:  and is the:re another contact (.) phone number for     
02       you? 
03       (0.5) 
04 CAL:  (.hh) u:::m it’s: my: (u:h) mobile phone  
05       number? [.hh     u:h] 
06 CON:          [okay (    )] 
07       (0.3) 
08 CAL:  ju:st one second. hh= 
09 CON:  =[sure thing.] 
10        [((receiver ]down)) 
11       (13.9) 
12       ((receiver[        up)] 
13 CAL:            [oh ◦three◦  ] it’s u:h o:h three five? 
14       (0.4) 
15 CON:  oh three five, 
16       (0.3) 
17 CAL:  oh six two 
18       (0.4) 
19 CON:  oh six two 
20       (0.4) 
21 CAL:  three (.) six (.) nine (.) two.   
22 CON:  three six nine two. thank you  
  
The question was understood by the caller as a request for an alternative contact 
number (lines one-two). The response inferentially confirmed the presence of the requested 
information, “it’s”, and specified what type of phone number it was, “my mobile phone 
number”. The turn, “just one second” displayed that the caller was going to temporarily leave 
the interaction. In moving to find the information, the caller displayed an understanding that 
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it was not sufficient to simply state the type of phone number it was; they were also obligated 
to provide it.  
A joint understanding of the upcoming temporary interactional exit was established at 
lines seven and eight. It was not made explicit that the caller would be retrieving the 
requested information. Rather, the purpose of the temporary interactional exit could be 
inferred by the conciliator because of conditional relevance, as the caller had yet to provide 
the required response to the question. 
 The call was suspended for nearly fourteen seconds and was resumed with the caller 
explicitly tying their talk as an answer to the question, through “it’s…” Owing to the non-co-
presence of speakers, the conciliator could not be sure as to what the caller physically did to 
find their mobile phone number. However, it was understandable from the provision of the 
information that the caller had done some work to find it. In making an effort to provide the 
relevant response, the caller displayed that furthering the progression of the sequence and the 
interaction was a practical concern.  
 In extract 4.3, the caller provided an account for why some requested information was 
not immediately forthcoming before leaving the interaction to find it.  
Extract 4.3: 
EGCC2015-008:  
01 CON:  [you] ↑said that you had email? can i get your 
02       email address? 
03 CAL:  no:w (0.2) i’m not- (0.2) ◦i can nev-◦ i’ve only had  
04       it for about .hhh (.) three or four months but i’ll  
05       get my: ((.hh/rustling)) uhhh ◦because◦  
06       sometimes (0.4) on my (.hhh) (hhh) ((background  
07       noise)) uhhh 
08       (0.9) 
09 CAL:  (i’ve been) 
10       (0.7) 
11 CAL:   ◦u:::hhm◦ ◦.hhh◦ (owh ch) i’ll put the ↑phone down  
12       [please just (one/a)  moment] 
13 CON:  [↑sure no         (problem) ] no problem. 
14       ((receiver down)) 
15       ((CAL away for 27.7 seconds)) 
16       ((Receiver up)) 
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17 CAL:  oh (i’m) sorry.=I have it in my diary [here:  .hh]= 
18 CON:                                        [oh ↑great.] 
19 CAL:  so- because my children have uh done this 
20       for me [orignally       ] put it in. .hh[hh it’s]  
21 CON:         [↑good ((echoes))]               [↑m(h)m ] 
22       (0.3) 
23 CAL:  Meg, .hh eh no capitals 
 In this case, the question explicitly requested some information, an email address, that 
the caller had referred to previously (lines one-two). The word selection in the request 
suggested that the conciliator was claiming an entitlement to ask the question. Curl and Drew 
(2008) found that when requests included “can” or “could”, as opposed to “I wonder if…”, it 
displayed a speaker’s entitlement to make the request.  
The initial response, “now…I’m not”, did not provide the email address. However, 
the following talk, “I’ve only had it for…”, inferentially confirmed that the caller did have, 
and knew, the information. The talk between lines three and four described the length of time 
that the caller had their email address, which also accounted for it not being provided. 
Seemingly for the caller, three to four months was a time period insufficient to know an email 
address by heart. At line 11, it was announced that the caller would “put the phone down” 
and thus leave the interaction.  
“Please just (one/a) moment”, displayed that the caller was treating the upcoming 
disruption as a breach. Evidence for this claim can be found in the word selection of the turn 
and in the following talk that is analysed below. “Just” has been found to have a minimizing 
function in conversation (Lindemann & Mauranen, 2001). Thus, alongside the “please” and 
the minimal time reference “a moment”, the use of “just” attempted to minimize an upcoming 
breach.  
 The call was put on hold for nearly 28 seconds (lines 14-16). In this case, the prior 
fragments of talk “I’ll get my…” and “sometimes on my…” alluded to the email address 
being located on some item. Therefore, the conciliator could have inferred that the caller was 
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working to satisfy their obligation to provide the information. The call was resumed with the 
caller apologising for the temporary interactional exit. The apology provided further evidence 
that the disruption was being treated by the caller as some kind of breach. In this case, the 
disruption was treated as a matter that needed to be both minimized (line 12) and apologised 
for. An informing, “I have it in my diary here”, displayed that the caller had physically 
located the requested information during the break in the interaction. The caller began to 
provide their email address at line 23. 
 Another way that callers found and retrieved the requested information was while 
remaining verbally engaged with conciliators. In other words, the callers treated the two 
activities as compatible, whereas in the previous cases they were treated as incompatible. In 
these cases, expressions such “wait a minute” anticipated a disruption to the progression of 
the interaction.  
 In extract 4.4, the caller made an effort to retrieve the information while still 
continuing to talk to the conciliator. The case below is presented to show that the caller still 
oriented to the obligation to provide the information, even when the expectation that they 
knew it was relaxed.  
Extract 4.4: 
EGCC2008-MARY4Q: 
01 CON:   [okay. and before  that when >was the] last< time=  
02 CAL:   [     ((rustling))            ughh   ] 
03 CON:   =it was read before [that? do you know?] 
04 CAL:                       [ ((rustling))     ] 
05 CAL:   ah yes: ◦hold on I’ll just get this◦ ou:t ◦.hh◦ .snih 
06       (0.9) 
07 CON:   ºI just [(wonder-)º ] 
08 CAL:           [ac-    act]ual read, h u::m  
09       (2.7) 
10 CAL:  º(o:wh) it doesn’t haveº (.) actual read ◦here (does)◦  
11       it? º.hhº (0.2) should do, ((rustling)) u::m=       
12       =((rustling continued)) 
13 CON:  ↑whi[ch ] 
14 CAL:      [the]  o:ne before tha::t actual reading ◦◦.hh◦◦  
15       uh was (.) April?  
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 A feature of the request for information in this case was that it had a tag question, “do 
you know”. As a “wh-” question, the request for information initially inferred a steep 
epistemic gradient between the speakers. Specifically, the conciliator was positioned as the 
K- speaker not knowing when the meter was last read, and the caller was positioned as the 
K+ speaker who knew the requested information.  The tag question served two functions. 
First, it attenuated the epistemic gradient (i.e. became shallow) because it positioned the 
caller as having a lower epistemic stance than the “wh-” question (by displaying that they 
may not know the information). It can also be understood as having relaxed the normative 
expectation that the caller knew the information, by orienting to the possibility that they did 
not.  
The “yes” confirmed the caller knew the information. The turn, “hold on…”, 
anticipated that the interaction would be disrupted, and “I’ll just get this out”, described what 
the caller was doing. An available inference was that the caller was moving to find out the 
“last time” the meter was read. Thus, the talk at line five displayed the caller working to fulfil 
their obligation to provide the requested information.  
The conciliator did not have visual access to the caller because it was a telephone-
mediated interaction. The non-co-presence meant that the conciliator would not have known 
what the caller was doing. However, the talk between lines five and twelve overcame this 
problem, by making the caller’s physical activity hearable and thus accessible to the 
conciliator. When combined with the aural resource of rustling, the caller’s talk made the 
work that was being done to find the requested information understandable to the conciliator. 
At line 14, this date was provided and was accepted by the conciliator (not included in 
extract).  
 In the extract below, the caller made a sustained effort, with some difficulty, to 
retrieve the customer number designated to them by their electricity provider. The sustained 
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effort is presented as clear evidence of the caller’s orientation to their obligation to provide 
the requested information. 
Extract 4.5: 
EGCC2015-001: 
01 CON:    .hhh and uh:::::::: .hh what’s y:our (0.6) 
02         mch .hh have you got you:r um cus:tomer 
03         number with blue[tower] 
04 CAL:                    [.hhhh] 
05         (0.8) 
06 CAL:    uh yes I can ge:t that (.)[(on again)] 
07 CON:                              [thank you ]      
08         (0.2) 
09 CAL:    ha::ng on a seco:nd (.) let me deal with this    
10         he::re for <a se:co:::nd> u::::h (oh I hope- I   
11         have-) (.)(uh) just hang (on) a s(h)ec(h)ond  
12         .hhhh (0.2) (◦just hang a sec let me- I’ll  
13         jus get that◦)(◦              ◦ )  
14         (2.0)  
15 CAL?:   ◦.hhhhh◦  ((rustling))  
16 CAL:    I’ll get that bluetower bill. (◦hang on◦) 
17         (1.1) 
18 CAL:    .hh (I’m on)(I’m after) (         ) jus tryna get    
19         onli:ne and it’s (frozen)=yeah (that’s what I    
20         needed today)(literally/let me just) .hhh (.) (hh)  
21         u::hm  
22         (1.2)  
23 CAL:    (     ) ◦this is not good is it◦ ◦hang on◦  
24         (            ) (oh we) just have to reboot this  
25         again (.) give me a bit of ti::me to come up back   
26         up again 
27         (0.8)  
28 CAL?:   .hhhhhhh 
29         (0.5) 
30 CAL:    (eh) um- hh 
31         ((background noise))  
32         (1.1) 
33 CAL:    ◦let me just◦ ◦um◦ (1.4) ◦see whats goin on here◦      
34         (2.0)    
35         ((2.8 seconds with some faint noise))   
36 CAL:    in meantime while this: going do  
37         you [want the the (eye vee/eye pee)] 
38 CON:        [.hh   that    that’s      okay] 
39         (0.5) 
40 CAL:    [>d’ya wan-<] >d’ya want< the eye pee- (.) <eye= 
41 CON:    [(        ) ] 
42 CAL:    =see [pee> number]  
43 CON:         [yes. if you] give me the eye see pee that 
44         would be very helpful. 
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The conciliator’s turn at line one was initially formatted as a content question, 
“what’s your…”, but was abandoned and re-formulated to a polar interrogative, “have 
you…”. That is, a question that was designed for a “yes” or “no” answer. The initial question 
assumed that the caller knew or had the requested information. In contrast, the re-formulated 
question displayed the possibility that the caller may not have or not know the customer 
number and thus relaxed the expectation for them to provide an answer.  
At line six the caller confirmed having the information. The following talk, “...I can 
get that” displayed an explicit commitment to the caller’s obligation to provide their customer 
number. An appreciation, “thank you”, was produced by the conciliator, presumably in 
acknowledgement of the effort the caller was making to provide the information. The next 
turn, “hang on a second”, anticipated a disruption to the interaction. It was followed by an 
informing, “let me deal with this here…”, making it clear that the caller was interacting with 
something.  
A practical problem emerged when it was stated that the bill was located on a 
computer (“tryna get online”) and that it could take some time to access it due to technical 
difficulties (“it’s frozen”). The continued delay was evaluated by the caller, “this is not good 
is it” (line 23). The negative evaluation displayed that the disruption to the interaction was 
being treated by the caller as a breach of their obligation to provide the information.  As with 
the prior case, the talk between lines 10 to 33 made what was visually accessible for the 
caller, hearable for the conciliator.  
Eventually, another piece of information was offered, “d’ya want the ICP number”. A 
point had been reached where the requested information was clearly not forthcoming and 
because of the technical difficulty with the computer, may not have been provided in the 
immediate future. Therefore, to satisfy their obligation, the caller provided some similar 
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information to further progress the interaction. In providing some alternative information, the 
caller also positioned themselves as doing their utmost to be helpful. 
 The extract below occurred around a minute and fifteen seconds later in the same 
interaction. It is presented to demonstrate the caller’s continued sense of obligation to provide 
an answer. 
Extract 4.6: 
EGCC2015-001: 
01 CAL:    I’m just logging in ◦here just hang (on a sons)◦ = 
02 CAL:    =[I’ll get] that (.) u::m I get my account number 
03 CON:    =[.hhh    ] 
04 CAL:    of- u:h blueto:wer [then- (         )]  
05 CON:                       [no don’t worry a ]bout tha:t= 
06 CON:    = I do[n’t (need it)    (      ) (   )] 
07 CAL:          [(oh=y’don need-) (yuh) okay   o]kay= 
 
 The caller offered to provide the account number after apparently having found it on 
the computer. However, the conciliator rejected the offer, stating that it was no longer 
needed. In this case, it was shown that if the normative obligation to provide some requested 
information was not satisfied, then it could persist and still be treated as relevant after a 
reasonable length of time had elapsed in the interaction.   
 Discussion  
 This chapter has focused on cases where a caller used expressions such as “hold on a 
minute” and “wait a second” to anticipate a disruption to the interaction in order to provide 
some requested information. The analysis has shown some of the normative dimensions of 
knowledge in these sequences. That is, who was expected to know what, and who was 
obligated to share that knowledge. The diagram presented in figure 4.1 summarises the 
normative dimensions of knowledge in request for information sequences. 
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Figure 4.1.  Normative dimensions of knowledge mobilised in request for information 
sequences in telephone-mediated dispute resolution. 
 
 The analysis noted that one norm oriented to in these sequences was an expectation 
that callers had or knew the requested information. Such an expectation was managed mainly 
through the format of the conciliators’ question. Further evidence was shown through callers 
explicitly or inferentially confirming that they had or knew the information before moving to 
find it. 
However, this chapter focused on demonstrating the normative obligations of callers 
in these sequences. The target expressions that anticipated a disruption to the interaction 
revealed the pervasively normative nature of requests for information. These expressions 
occurred after conciliators requested some information, which callers did not immediately 
provide. The analysis showed that callers would move to find and retrieve the information, 
often going to great lengths to do so. Such conduct clearly displayed callers’ orientations to 
their normative obligations and epistemic responsibilities as recipients; to provide 
information when requested.  
 The findings provide further evidence to support a preference for progressivity in 
talk-in-interaction. Stivers and Robinson (2006) studied question-answer sequences in multi-
party interaction, where questions that explicitly selected a next speaker were answered by a 
different person. In such sequences, speakers demonstrated their orientation to a preference 
Request for 
Information. 
 
Normative expectation for caller to have or 
know the requested information. 
Normative obligation for caller to provide 
the requested information. 
 
 
 
44 
 
for progressivity by prioritising the provision of an answer over that of the obligation for a 
selected next speaker to respond. In this chapter, a preference for progressivity was shown 
through the work that callers did to find and retrieve the requested information. The 
preference for progressivity was clearly evident in the cases of temporary interactional exits. 
In these cases, callers treated providing the relevant second-pair-part, and thus satisfying 
sequential progressivity, as taking priority over remaining verbally engaged in the 
conversation.  
In the cases examined here, callers went to different lengths to find the requested 
information. One possible reason that could explain why non-forthcoming information was 
treated as such an issue in these calls is that they were a form of institutional interaction. 
Institutional talk involves speakers producing actions and being oriented to specific goals that 
are constitutive of particular institutional settings (Heritage & Clayman, 2010). The 
sequences examined in this chapter were part of the institutional task of establishing the facts 
of the complaint. As a result, providing a response progressed both the request for 
information sequences and the broader interactional activity of which they were a part. 
Therefore, the normative obligation to provide a response may have been more ‘pronounced’ 
in these calls than it would usually be in mundane conversation because of the overarching 
project both speakers were engaged in accomplishing. A study of these sequences in 
everyday conversation would establish the generalizability of the present findings. 
Chapter overview 
This chapter has described some of the normative dimensions of knowledge in request 
for information sequences, when an answer was not immediately provided. The following 
chapter focuses on a different question-answer sequence, ones where a response is provided 
and where the question is formatted as a declarative request for confirmation. The analysis 
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shows how the epistemic rights and entitlements to knowledge are negotiated in those 
sequences.  
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5 
Establishing the facts of the complaint: Epistemic rights and 
reality construction. 
The practical problem that is the focus of this chapter is the mutual establishment of a 
dispute to be resolved. In particular, the analysis focuses on one aspect of this; how the two 
speakers jointly produced the relevant ‘facts’ of the complaint. Without agreeing on the facts 
of the matter, the complaint could not be further progressed through the dispute resolution 
process. Callers regularly presented their problems in the form of a narrative in their initial 
turns of talk. Subsequently, conciliators could request confirmation of some of that 
information. The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on declarative request for 
confirmation sequences as a resource for jointly constructing an ‘official’ version of reality. 
 Callers described some aspects of the complaint, from what was likely an infinite 
range of possible descriptions about their experiences. Similarly, conciliators only selected 
particular details to focus on for further questioning. The declarative questions positioned 
conciliators as having a relatively equal epistemic stance to callers, and thus having some 
degree of rights to the information. Thus, these questions displayed a relatively shallow 
epistemic gradient between speakers. An important point was that the questions concerned 
details that callers had primary epistemic rights and entitlements to know, because the 
information was within their epistemic domains.  
The analysis conceptualizes the declarative questions as descriptions because they 
“formulate[d] some object or event as something” (Potter, 1996, p.111). As descriptions, the 
questions involved a detail being constructed in some way, as a particular version of reality. 
The questions proffered this version of reality to callers for confirmation, in order to mutually 
establish the official ‘fact’ of the matter. The responses could accept these descriptions. 
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However, the responses could also alter the descriptions and construct the matter in a 
different way.  
 The following analysis is based on a collection of 78 declarative requests for 
confirmation and the accompanying responses. The analysis is structured around the response 
formats and ways that they managed speakers’ rights to knowledge. I propose that the 
responses can be placed along a conceptual continuum. At one end, are responses where the 
epistemic stance and entitlement of conciliators displayed in the declarative questions are 
accepted. At the other end, are responses that rejected the epistemic stance and rights of 
conciliators by correcting some aspect of the question. These responses strongly asserted the 
callers’ epistemic entitlements over the matter at hand. Furthermore, the answers shifted the 
epistemic gradient back to one of relative asymmetry by elevating the caller’s epistemic 
stance. The analysis also considers how the questions and answers jointly constructed the 
detail to be agreed upon as a version of reality.  
Analysis 
Simple confirmation 
  Simple confirmation was the most common response format in the collection, 
comprising 31% (n=24) of cases. Extracts 5.1 and 5.2 are presented below as examples of 
“yes”-confirming responses to declarative requests for confirmation. 
Extract 5.1: 
EGCC2008-CONNIE6C: 
01 CON:   >okay so did you< .hh (0.2) bu- n’ you paid that 
02        (    ) (.) ninety¿ 
03        (0.2) 
04 CAL:   yup 
 
Extract 5.2: 
EGCC2015-004: 
01 CON:   ◦.hh◦ okay (0.2) u::m and (.) it’s been ongoing 
02        since then? 
03        (0.4) 
04 CAL:   yeah. 
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 The questions in the extracts above were directed toward establishing some detail of 
the complaint; in the first case that the caller had paid a pre-existing amount of money to their 
electricity provider (extract 5.1) and in the second, that the complaint related to a continuing 
dispute (extract 5.2). They are type-conforming responses because they provided the “yes” 
answer that was projected by the question (Raymond, 2003). These kinds of type-conforming 
responses accept both the design and assumptions of the prior question (Raymond, 2003).   
 Extract 5.3 shows that confirmation could also be accomplished by negative 
responses. 
Extract 5.3: 
EGCC2015-002: 
01 CON:   =(ri::ght/fri::ght-) (yup) okay so there’s 
02        no reason why it shouldn’t [be r]ead. (◦◦.hh◦◦) 
03 CAL:                              [no. ] 
  
 Negatively formulated questions, such as that above, are confirmed by “no” responses 
(Raymond, 2003). In the case above, “no” confirmed that there was nothing preventing the 
meter from being read. Extract 5.3 provided further evidence that answers doing simple 
confirmation accepted the design, assumptions and epistemic stances displayed in the 
question. 
 In regards to reality construction, the responses above confirmed a proffered version 
of reality and thus it can be seen that in these sequences, some fact of the complaint was 
being jointly established and agreed upon.   
The three cases above have shown that type-conforming responses performed simple 
confirmation. In these responses, the callers accepted all aspects of the prior question. I 
propose that these responses represent one end of an epistemic continuum, whereby they 
fully accept the epistemic stances, rights and entitlements claimed in the declarative question. 
Thus, the shallow epistemic gradient inferred by the question format was also accepted by the 
type-conforming responses. 
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Confirmation by repetition  
Responses also departed from the type-conforming format preferred by the question, 
to confirm the question and assert callers’ primary rights to the matter. Responses formatted 
as full or partial repeats of the prior question comprised 6% (n=5) of the collected cases.  
Previous research by Schegloff (1996) has documented how responses can confirm an 
allusion. Schegloff examined cases where an initial speaker’s talk implied something in a 
first turn and another speaker’s turn would then state what was alluded to in the prior turn. In 
the third turn, the initial speaker would produce a verbatim repeat of the other speaker’s turn. 
This repeat would confirm the question’s content and that it had been previously alluded to 
(rather than explicitly stated; Schegloff, 1996).  
 I suggest that repeat responses also functioned to confirm something that callers had 
previously alluded to. I further posit that these responses also displayed callers’ primary 
epistemic rights to the information. 
Extract 5.4: 
EGCC2008-CONNIE6C: 
01 CON:    [okay so, ]and [then oxyg]e- so you told  
02         Oxygen you’d make a one off payment of ninety:,= 
03 CAL:    =[yeh=And I] made the payment 
04 CON:    =[ . hhh   ] 
05 CON:    okay and they <accepted tha:t>= 
06 CAL:    =they accepted that. ºmh:º 
07 CON:    okay 
 
Extract 5.5:  
EGCC2008-CONNIE6C: 
01 CAL:   =[and then] a week or two ago goes by: (0.2) .hhh  
02        and (0.5) I get a >tra:ffic fine.< (0.4) two hundred  
03        dollar fine (0.8) right? 
04        (0.4) 
05 CAL:   now (.) because I mow lawns for a living .hh if I  
06        don’t pay that fine ih- they can impound my vehicle  
07        (0.2) 
08 CAL:   =[r i g h t ?] 
09 CON:   =[>so this is] a< fi:ne (0.3) separate  
10        from [the company.] 
11 CAL:        [ .  hhh     ] 
12 CAL:   separate from the com[pany] 
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13 CON:                        [okay] 
 
 Both questions presented allusions of the callers’ prior talk (Schegloff, 1996). For 
example, in extract 5.4, the caller’s previous talk stated that a payment of ninety dollars was 
made to their power company, with the allusion being that the company accepted the 
payment.  Both responses were repeats of parts of the prior question. As with confirming an 
allusion, both responses repeated in agreement with the question (Schegloff, 1996). The 
responses confirmed the question and that it was indeed an allusion of the previous talk.   
 The cases above provided evidence that in using repeat responses callers were 
claiming primary rights to the matter. This was achieved in several ways. First, the allusions, 
although articulated by conciliators, were inferentially available from information provided 
by the callers. Presenting the allusions in declarative questions positioned conciliators as 
claiming relatively equal epistemic stances, and thus some rights to the information. Second, 
in confirming through repeating part of the question, the responses displayed that the 
information was in the callers’ epistemic domains, and thus displayed their primary rights to 
the knowledge (Heritage & Raymond, 2012). In other words, callers claimed back the rights 
to the information by repeating the allusions.  
 I propose that repeat responses claimed a stronger epistemic entitlement to the 
information than simple confirmation. Although repeats confirmed the question, they also 
displayed that callers had primary epistemic rights over the matter at hand.  
Confirmation and adjustment 
 A third confirming response format also adjusted some aspects of the question. These 
responses comprised 13% (n=10) of cases. Extract 5.6 shows one response format that 
confirmed and adjusted a question.  
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Extract 5.6: 
EGCC2015-003: 
01 CON:   and that was the month that- that- that was 
02        the important [(bit) for you] 
03 CAL:                 [yes          ] 
04 CON:   okay 
05 CAL:   yes that- that was the month (>uh- de-<) with the 
06        problem. 
  
The question constructed the detail in a particular way and presented a version of 
reality to the caller for confirmation as an acceptable ‘fact’ of the matter. The response 
confirmed the question (“yes”) and then repeated “that was the month”. Following this, “that 
was the important bit” was changed to “with the problem”, locating the former as the 
problematic and adjusted aspect. In adjusting the prior description, the response slightly 
altered, and thus re-constructed, the fact being confirmed. 
Discursive psychology has highlighted that description can be part and parcel of 
assessment (Potter, 1998). The question described and thus evaluated the month as 
“important” to the caller. The response altered this description, and assessed it negatively as a 
“problem”. In doing so, it displayed that the prior description was insufficient in its 
assessment. The adjustment upgraded “the month” from just being significant (“important”), 
to something that had potentially had a negative impact on the caller (“problem”). Therefore, 
the response also worked up the complainability of the matter by making available the 
negative inferences associated with a “problem”. 
Although the case above was a question-answer sequence, the rights to assess the 
matter were also being treated as relevant. Speakers making a first assessment display some 
right and entitlement to be able to make such a claim (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). 
However, in this case, the caller had primary rights because it was their knowledge that was 
being assessed. The response undercut the rights claimed by the conciliator in making the 
first assessment by displaying that the initial assessment was insufficient. As such, the caller 
asserted their primary epistemic rights to assess “the month”. 
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Extract 5.7 shows another response format used to accomplish confirmation and 
adjustment. In this case, the response was grammatically fitted as a linguistic extension to the 
question.  
Extract 5.7: 
EGCC2008-CONNIE4Q: 
01 CON:    okay.=and you’re on a low user rate? 
02         (0.6) 
03 CAL:    fo::r the water. yes. 
04         (0.7) 
05 CON:    oh (.) kayhh .hhh alright.  
  
The question requested confirmation that the caller’s power bill was being calculated 
using a low user rate13. Establishing this detail was crucial to the business at hand because it 
was consequential to the disputed issue, which was the size of the power bill. The first turn 
constructional unit of the response was formatted as an increment to the question. That is, it 
was grammatically fitted as if it were a continuation of an already complete turn (Fox, Ford, 
& Thompson, 2002). The increment adjusted the question by specifying that the low user rate 
was for the water. In this case, the type-conforming token “yes” was added to the turn. 
Therefore, confirmation was delayed until adjustments to the question were made.  
The response asserted the caller’s primary epistemic rights to the matter at hand in 
two ways. First, by displaying that the prior description was insufficiently specific and 
providing more specific information to which presumably only the caller would have access. 
Second, by confirming the adjustments made to the question instead of the description in the 
first-pair-part. In other words, the caller confirmed their description rather than the 
conciliator’s description. 
 In relation to reality construction, the response made alterations to the version of 
reality proffered by the conciliator. The response instead displayed that the joint 
                                                     
13 Low user plans involve companies charging households who use less electricity at a lower daily rate 
(Consumer New Zealand, n.d.). 
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establishment of the matter was contingent on the adjustments made by the caller. The talk at 
line five provided evidence that the conciliator accepted this altered description as the ‘fact’ 
of the matter.  
The chapter has so far analysed three different types of responses. I propose that the 
confirmation and adjustment cases lie further along the continuum than simple confirmation 
and repeat responses. I posit that these cases, in altering and adjusting the description in the 
question, more strongly asserted the callers’ primary epistemic rights over the matters being 
agreed upon. 
Adjusting answers 
 The following section focuses on what I have termed adjusting answers. These 
responses comprised 27% (n=21) of cases in the collection. Seven cases are presented to 
show two functions accomplished by adjusting answers; specification and correction. The 
analysis demonstrates how adjusting answers managed callers’ epistemic rights and 
entitlements and how such responses were implicated in reality construction. 
Accepting with further specification. Adjusting answers sometimes provided a 
more specific description of some matter housed in a question. Extract 5.8 is presented to 
show how specification was used to get a detail of the complaint exactly right. 
Extract 5.8: 
EGCC2008-MARY4Q: 
01 CON:  =ºokayº (0.2) righty oh and you’ve got a hundred and  
02        thirty odd dollar [bill now.] 
03 CAL:                     [   .hhh  ] hundred and thirty one  
04        forty one.= 
05 CON:  ºyeahº.= 
06 CAL:  =mm:  
 
The question sought confirmation that the caller’s bill was “a hundred and thirty odd 
dollar[s]”. The bill’s size was described approximately, displaying that an approximation was 
sufficient for the purposes of questioning. The response was formatted as a partial repeat of 
the question, replacing “thirty odd dollar” with “thirty one forty one”. It specified the exact 
 
 
 
54 
 
amount of the bill, while also confirming that the caller had the bill. Thus, what was relevant 
for the caller was getting the detail of the complaint just right. The response rejected 
approximation as a sufficient version of reality and replaced it with a more precise 
description, to the point of specifying the exact number of cents (“forty one”).  
Drew (2003) documented how the precision of descriptions was a practical concern 
for speakers in institutional interactions such as courtroom cross-examinations and visits to 
the doctor. Drew found that when laypeople constructed an imprecise description, an 
institutional representative could adjust it to be more precise. In the case described above, the 
opposite occurred. The caller (layperson) adjusted the imprecise description of the 
conciliator’s question (institutional representative). The precise description displayed the 
caller’s primary epistemic rights to know the amount of the bill. The specification was 
accepted by the conciliator and as a result, the caller’s reconstructed version of reality (as 
more specific) was jointly established as a fact for the official record. 
Extract 5.9 shows an example of how specification could also work up the legitimacy 
and complainability of a matter. In this case, it was accomplished through invoking a 
membership category and its associated inferences. Prior to the extract, the conciliator asked 
about the caller’s previous contact with a customer representative in a power company’s 
complaints department.  
Extract 5.9: 
EWOV-289011: 
01 CON:   [ .h]h and she was in the customer  
02        advocacy department? 
03 CAL:   she was in thuh- in the (.) top top pa:rt. 
 
 The conciliator asked about a person who was a member of the customer advocacy 
department (a particular category), presumably in order to be able to contact the individual. 
The response was formatted as a partial repeat of the question, “she was in the…” The turn 
also adjusted the prior question, replacing “customer advocacy department” with “top top 
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part”. The replacement confirmed the representative was in that department and further 
specified where. The response treated the initial premise of the question as acceptable, but 
displayed that it was insufficiently specific. 
One function of the specification was to work up the legitimacy and complainability 
of the matter. Sacks (1992) noted that the membership categories used by speakers in 
conversation are laden with inferences. Furthermore, these categories and their associated 
inferences accomplish actions (Sacks, 1992). The response identified the representative as a 
member of the category of the “top top part” of the customer advocacy department. An 
inference associated with being in the upper echelons of the department was that the 
representative had a high level of authority. Deploying the membership category of the 
person involved worked up the legitimacy and complainability of the caller’s complaint 
because even someone with authority in the electricity company had done nothing to resolve 
the problem. The response also claimed and displayed the caller’s epistemic rights to the 
information by presenting a more precise description. 
 Extract 5.10 shows another example of specification working up legitimacy and 
complainability. In this instance, it was achieved through an upgraded specification, from 
“inaccurate” to “wildly inaccurate”. 
Extract 5.10: 
EGCC2015-007: 
01 CON:    =mghm so what you’re saying is that .hhh the  
02         estimated reading was- was inaccurate? 
03         (0.2) 
04 CON:    .hhh [did you get (      )] 
05 CAL:         [( m:      ) wil:dly ] inaccurate. 
  
The question was designed to establish a detail central to the complaint. Specifically, 
that an estimated meter reading was “inaccurate”. The response partially repeated the 
question (“inaccurate”) and added “wildly”. The response confirmed and further specified by 
upgrading the degree of inaccuracy.  
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The specification worked up the legitimacy, and thus the complainability, of the 
matter by formulating it in more extreme terms. Pomerantz (1986) showed that extreme case 
formulations, such as “wildly inaccurate”, can legitimise claims in the face of possible doubt. 
In the case above, by describing the reading as “wildly inaccurate” the caller made it more 
certain that the inaccuracy of the reading was a problem and thus a complainable matter.  
  The question described and constructed the matter in a particular way (as 
“inaccurate”). However, the response adjusted that description and therefore re-constructed 
the detail being agreed upon as more legitimate and complainable. The response also asserted 
the caller’s primary epistemic rights. In epistemic terms, callers have the rights to describe 
and assess their own experiences (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). In this case, the response 
asserted these rights by providing a negative assessment of the meter’s accuracy.  
The cases presented so far in this section, have been responses that adjusted some 
aspect of a question for being insufficiently specific. Stivers and Hayashi (2010) noted that 
non-type-conforming responses involving specification, similar to those presented above, 
treated a prior question as acceptable but with modifications required. In these cases, the 
basic descriptions in the questions were treated as acceptable, although unable to be more 
simply confirmed. However, some aspect was treated as insufficiently specific. 
The responses involved precise descriptions of some detail of the complaint. Precision 
of a description is a matter essentially within the purview of a speaker whose epistemic 
domain the information comes from (Drew, 2003; Heritage & Raymond, 2005). As such, the 
responses asserted callers’ epistemic rights and entitlements to the information. That is, 
callers’ displayed themselves as K+ speakers relative to conciliators. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that adjusting answers involving specification claimed stronger 
epistemic entitlement than responses involving confirmation and adjustment.  
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Correction. Adjusting answers also corrected aspects of a prior question. I propose 
that correction asserted an even stronger epistemic entitlement than specification. 
Specification cases treated a question as acceptable but requiring further specification. 
However, correction cases more strongly asserted callers’ epistemic rights by displaying that 
some aspect of a question was wrong. 
In extract 5.11, the conciliator described the caller’s problem as one of an 
“overestimation”, whereas the problem was actually an “underestimation”.  
Extract 5.11: 
EGCC2008-LINDA1C 
01 CON:  okay. so they’re overestimating  
02       the b[ills   ] 
03 CAL:       [they’re] underes[timating (the)   amount     ] 
04 CON:                        [<oh >sorry hang on the other]=      
05       =way<. >yih yih<. 
06       (0.3) 
07 CAL:  a::nd (.) it’s an ongoing problem.  
08       (0.3) 
09 CON:  ºokay.º h  
  
The question displayed an upshot of the caller’s prior turns; that the power company 
was “overestimating” the power “bills”. The response repeated the substance of the question 
and replaced “overestimating” with “underestimating”, and “bills” with “amount”. The entire 
description within the question was rejected and corrected. The response positioned the caller 
as the K+, or more knowledgeable, speaker. The caller’s primary epistemic rights were 
strongly asserted through the response positioning the conciliator as wrong.  
The response can be understood as having altered the speakers’ epistemic positioning, 
and thus also having changed the epistemic gradient. The declarative question positioned 
both speakers as having relatively equal epistemic stances, and by extension equal epistemic 
rights. However, by correcting the prior description, the caller elevated their epistemic stance 
and undercut the positioning of the conciliator. In effect, this pushed the epistemic gradient 
from one of relative symmetry to one of relative asymmetry.  
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 The “oh” prefaced turn at line four marked a change in the conciliator’s displayed 
understanding (Heritage, 1984a) and was followed by an apology acknowledging that a 
breach was committed (Robinson, 2004). The breach was that the question proffered the 
wrong information. The apology and subsequent naming of the offense, “the other way”, 
brought the business of correction to the interactional surface. It was an example of what 
Jefferson (1987) termed exposed correction, because the talk became occupied with doing 
correction. The explicit registering of the correction by the conciliator along with the “okay” 
at line nine, provided evidence that the description and re-construction of reality in the 
response was being mutually agreed upon as the fact of the matter.  
Extract 5.12 is presented as an example of correction functioning to work up the 
complainability of a matter.  
Extract 5.12: 
EGCC2015-002 
01 CON:    ri:ght. so- so you had a conversation with  
02         them about [estimating bi:lls:    ] 
03 CAL:               [we’ve had lots of conv]ersations= 
04 CAL:    =for them and probably my little fi:le you know 
05          on the note on the bottom of their computer 
06          screen about me and my accou:nt [.hhh wh]ich= 
07 CON:                                     [   (oh)] 
08 CAL:    =probably full up by n(h)o(h)w [hhh(h)uh hih hah]= 
09 CON:                                   [     £okay£     ] 
  
The question described the caller’s prior contact with their electricity company as 
being a single conversation. The question functioned to establish an institutionally relevant 
aspect of the complaint. Specifically, a key requirement for a complaint to qualify as a 
dispute to be resolved is that callers have complained to their providers first (EGCC, 2014). 
The response partially repeated the question and modified it, replacing “a conversation” with 
“lots of conversations”. The replacement located the description of a single conversation as 
the trouble to be corrected. In providing the correct information, the caller asserted their 
position as the speaker with the epistemic entitlement to the matter at hand. 
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 The question proffered a particular version of reality to the caller for confirmation. 
However, the response rejected an aspect of the version of reality and re-constructed the 
‘correct’ detail. In particular, the re-constructed matter displayed that what was relevant for 
the caller was the excessive amount of contact with their power company. The correction to 
multiple conversations having occurred worked up the complainability of the issue. An 
increased number of complaints to the provider implied action from the caller and fault on 
behalf of the company, because the issue had yet to be resolved. In other words, many 
conversations having occurred with no action from the company made the matter more 
problematic for the caller.  
The next case shows that correction could be done in different ways. In extract 5.13, 
correction was done alongside further informing.  
Extract 5.13: 
EGCC2015-001: 
01 CON:   =[a:nd] thee::::::: the letter is addressed to 
02        you danny luck? 
03        (0.3) 
04 CAL:   .hh the letter is addressed to:::, (.) the  
05        occupi:e:r enn gee ess nineteen tomato avenue 
06        terawhiti ngarua five double nine six. 
07 CON:   ◦alright◦ the occupier enn gee ess::  
08        (1.4)  
09 CAL:   yup.  
  
The question sought to establish whether a disconnection letter was addressed 
personally to the caller. The version of reality proffered was premised on a reasonable 
inference that if the caller received a letter it would have been addressed to them. The 
response replaced the name “Danny Luck” and provided the correction, “the occupier”. It 
also specified the exact information contained on the letter, such as the postcode. Thus, an 
informing was also treated as relevant by the caller.  
In treating the prior description as both incorrect and insufficient, the caller strongly 
asserted their epistemic entitlement to the matter at hand. The correction was accepted, in an 
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example of exposed correction, through repetition at line seven. The epistemic gradient was 
conceptually adjusted to one of relative asymmetry through the caller asserting their K+ 
stance and reflexively rejecting the question’s positioning of the conciliator as almost equally 
knowledgeable. However, in repeating the correction, the conciliator also displayed their 
newfound knowledge of the matter. Thus, the epistemic gradient can be conceptualized as 
having been switched back to the relative symmetry inferred by the initial question, because 
of the now joint knowledge of the matter.  
Extract 5.14 shows correction being done by further explication of a question’s 
premise.  
Extract 5.14: 
EGCC2015-016 
01 CON:  >suh-< so you tried to open an account with another   
02       company? 
03       (0.7) 
04 CAL:  i’ve (been)- I’ve actually got a pre-exisiting, I was   
05       with Exeter down in Jerningham=I’ve moved from  
06       Jerningham to Utley. 
07       (0.4) 
08 CON:  ok[ay ] 
09 CAL:    [and] i’ve brought my- my account with me 
10       (0.3) 
11 CON:  yeah. (0.4) alrig[ht] 
 
 The question was geared towards establishing whether the caller had attempted to 
open an account with another power company. The response stated that the caller had 
“actually got a pre-existing” account with the other power company “Exeter”. The “actually” 
marked the following talk as counter to something that was assumed in the question (Clift, 
2001). Thus, the response rejected the basic premise of the question. The response displayed 
that the conciliator was wrong in their description. The rejection was followed with further 
description that established a different version of reality.  
  In displaying that the previous description was wrong, the response undercut the 
relatively equal epistemic stance of the conciliator displayed in the question. The further 
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description also informed the conciliator of the correct details. Informings involve speakers 
describing matters from their epistemic domain (Heritage, 2012b). The informing positioned 
the conciliator as the party being informed, and thus as the K- speaker, and reflexively 
asserted the caller’s K+ stance (as the informer). The talk at lines eight and eleven accepted 
the re-construction of the matter. Accordingly, the fact was established as jointly understood. 
Conceptually, this would mean a symmetrical epistemic gradient had been achieved.  
Explicit disconfirmation 
 Explicit disconfirmation was accomplished through responses formatted with 
disconfirmation tokens (“no”) and then talk that corrected or adjusted aspects of the question. 
Explicit disconfirmation comprised only 6% (n=5) of cases in the collection. I propose that 
these cases involved the strongest claims and assertion of callers’ epistemic rights to the 
relevant information. 
 Extract 5.15 shows the caller explicitly disconfirming and then correcting the prior 
question.  
Extract 5.15: 
EGCC2015-007 
01 CON:     okay let’s just go over the readings again for 
02          a minute. .hh [now] when Watfordshire took over 
03 CAL:                   [mm ] 
04 CON:     .hh thee:: (.) u:h (.) this is two meters. two              
05          smart meters at your property?= 
06 CAL:     =no no this- >this is just< one meter and this is  
07          for the water pump. 
 
The question sought to confirm the number and type of meters that were the subject of 
the complaint14. The question was explicitly disconfirmed at the beginning of the caller’s turn 
(“no, no”). The response rejected the prior description and provided the correct information 
                                                     
14 Smart meters differ from traditional electricity meters because they do not require manual readings from 
technicians and instead provide information about household electricity consumption to a remote source 
(Electricity Authority, 2013). 
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by replacing “two meters” with “just one meter”. It was also further specified what meter was 
the problem (“for the water pump”).  
The declarative question displayed the conciliator claiming relatively equal epistemic 
rights to the knowledge. However, in explicitly disconfirming and correcting, the response 
displayed the caller’s definitive epistemic entitlement to the information. As such, the answer 
elevated the caller to being the more knowledgeable speaker (K+ stance) and thus pushed 
back against the shallow epistemic gradient inferred by the question. The version of reality 
proffered by the conciliator was rejected and the response re-constructed it entirely.  
The case below shows another example of a caller explicitly disconfirming and then 
correcting a previous description.  
Extract 5.16: 
EWOV-233006 
01 CON:   and you’ve lost your mobile phone. 
02 CAL:   no I’ve got it back now. 
03 CON:   oh[  kay       ]                             [so- ]= 
04 CAL:     [>I found it<] down the back seat >of the< [car¿] 
 
 The question functioned to establish that the caller was not able to be contacted on 
their mobile phone. The “no” at the beginning of the response explicitly rejected what was 
being asked. The following talk, “I’ve got it back now”, corrected the previous description. In 
epistemic terms, the response rejected the relatively equal positioning in the question of the 
conciliator having some rights to the knowledge. Furthermore, it displayed a strong claim to 
the caller’s epistemic entitlement to the information.  
 The adjusting answers accomplishing correction displayed that a prior description was 
wrong. However, the explicit disconfirmation tokens contained in these responses displayed 
an inherently more disaffiliative or ‘face-threatening’ action (Stivers, 2008). As a result, I 
propose that the explicit disconfirmation cases represented the strongest possible assertion of 
callers’ epistemic rights by claiming their full entitlement to the matter being agreed upon. In 
asserting callers’ epistemic rights, the responses also pushed back on the equal epistemic 
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stances of conciliators that were claimed by asking questions in a declarative format. 
Accordingly, the relatively shallow epistemic gradient inferred by the declarative questions 
could be conceptualized as having been adjusted to a steep gradient through the responses 
elevating callers’ K+ stances. 
Summary 
 The analysis identified and described various types of responses to declarative 
requests for confirmation. It showed that each response type functioned differently with 
respect to the epistemic entitlements they claimed. The responses ranged from those that 
made no claim to the callers’ epistemic rights, through to those which claimed the callers’ 
full epistemic rights and entitlements to the information referred to in the question.  
 Figure 5.1 summarizes the results. It shows the types of responses and their 
corresponding actions on a continuum. Simple confirmation sits at one end of the continuum 
and explicit disconfirmation is at the other. The other responses sit between those two ends 
and show increasingly stronger assertions of callers’ primary epistemic rights and 
entitlements to the relevant information. 
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 A key characteristic of responses that claimed epistemic entitlement was the changes 
made to the prior question. For example, in the cases of adjusting answers more specific or 
correct details were described. These adjustments were practices by which callers’ primary 
epistemic rights were displayed and asserted. Such adjustments provided details that were 
within the callers’ epistemic domains.  
 The two types of responses to the right of the continuum represented the strongest 
assertions of callers’ epistemic entitlements. In conceptual terms, the declarative question 
format inferred a relatively shallow epistemic gradient between speakers, as shown in figure 
5.2 by the dashed line. The responses displayed callers’ greater epistemic rights to some 
information and therefore elevated their epistemic stance. Furthermore, these responses 
rejected the relatively equal epistemic positioning that conciliators claimed by formulating 
their questions as declaratives. As a result, the responses adjusted the epistemic gradient to 
one of relative asymmetry, as shown by the fixed line in figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. The shifting of epistemic gradients by responses that strongly asserted callers’ 
epistemic entitlements.  
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 In the cases of adjusting answers it was shown that conciliators produced talk that 
displayed their new understanding of the re-constructed matter. Thus, in these instances, the 
epistemic gradient can be understood as having returned to one of relative symmetry, to 
reflect the establishment of a joint understanding of reality.  
Questions and their responses were conceptualized as descriptions that constructed 
some detail of the complaint as a version of reality. The descriptions in the questions 
constructed the details of the complaint in particular ways. Through the declarative format, 
these details were constructed as shared knowledge, which was achieved in part by the 
conciliators claiming relatively equal epistemic rights to the information. Responses could 
accept or modify these versions of reality. For example, those that contained adjustments re-
constructed the proffered version of reality in another way. Furthermore, when re-
constructing a version of reality, callers could also simultaneously claim their epistemic 
entitlements to the matter. Therefore, the analysis showed that epistemic rights and 
entitlements were implicated in reality construction. 
  In summary, the analysis of declarative requests for confirmation highlighted that the 
epistemic issues of ‘who knows what’ and ‘who has the rights to know it’ were observably 
relevant to the speakers as they worked to accomplish a joint understanding of the facts of the 
complaint. 
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6 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 This thesis investigated epistemics and reality construction in social interaction, 
focusing on the institutional setting of telephone-mediated dispute resolution. Some 
normative dimensions of knowledge were empirically demonstrated by examining request for 
information sequences where the progression of an interaction was disrupted. It was found 
that callers oriented to their epistemic responsibilities when answering questions. These 
responsibilities were that callers were expected to know or have some information and that 
they were obligated to provide it when requested. The analysis also found that epistemic 
rights were relevant to callers and conciliators as they jointly constructed an official version 
of the complaint in declarative request for confirmation sequences. The findings on the 
normative dimensions were discussed at the end of chapter five. As such, this chapter only 
considers the contribution the analytic work on declarative request for confirmation 
sequences makes to an understanding of epistemic matters and reality construction in 
interaction. The research is then evaluated alongside providing directions for future research.  
Epistemic matters in interaction 
 Epistemics is a relatively new domain of research in conversation analysis. In 
particular, the epistemic dynamics of question-answer and assessment sequences have been 
established (e.g. Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Stivers, 2005). Conversation analytic research 
on question-answer sequences has been broad, examining different forms of questions 
together (e.g. Heritage & Raymond, 2012; Stivers & Hayashi, 2010). The present research 
narrowed its focus by holding the type of question constant and examining how the responses 
managed epistemic rights. By restricting the focus to declarative request for confirmation 
sequences, the analysis showed the ways that speakers can accept or contest being positioned 
on relatively equal epistemic footings. 
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 Previous conversation analytic research has mapped out various response formats to 
questions. Further, research has considered the actions that they accomplish and how 
epistemic matters might be implicated in these answers. Notably, Heritage and Raymond 
(2012) documented different types of responses to polar questions, which included minimal 
confirmation, repeat responses and repeats with disconfirmation. They also identified how 
these responses resisted or accepted aspects of prior questions. For example, it was shown 
that a repeat response resisted the type-conforming format preferred by a question and could 
also display a recipient’s epistemic rights and entitlements to some information. Hakulinen 
(2001) also identified different response formats to polar questions in Finnish conversation, 
and placed these on a cline from confirming to negating a prior question. 
 By identifying a larger range of answers, this thesis uniquely proposed that the 
responses could be placed along an epistemic continuum. At one end of the continuum was 
simple confirmation, which involved no explicit display of a caller’s epistemic rights to the 
relevant information. Other responses displayed increasingly stronger assertions of the 
callers’ epistemic rights and entitlements. At the opposite end, disconfirmation and correction 
responses displayed a caller’s full epistemic entitlement. The analysis provides further 
support for an established conversation analytic finding; that responses to questions are a 
fundamental place in talk-in-interaction where recipients can assert their primary epistemic 
rights to some knowledge (Heritage & Raymond, 2012).  
Stivers (2005) identified the practice of modified repeats, which were responses 
where a recipient repeated all or part of a prior question and stressed or expanded a particular 
linguistic item. Stivers argued that these answers were a way for respondents to assert their 
primary rights over a claim in the previous question. The adjusting answers identified in this 
thesis are similar to modified repeats in two respects. Both could be formatted in the same 
way and adjusting answers were also a way for recipients to display their primary epistemic 
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rights. However, there are important differences. Adjusting answers were found in response 
to questions that explicitly requested confirmation. In contrast, modified repeats were 
produced in response to questions that did not make confirmation relevant. Furthermore, 
adjusting answers involved more substantial modifications to what was repeated, through 
replacing or inserting lexical items different to those in the question. 
 Some of the adjusting answers in the collection appeared to resemble what Stivers and 
Hayashi (2010) termed transformative answers. The latter were responses that made 
adjustments to a prior question and thus treated it as asking about something else. Adjusting 
answers and transformative answers could both accomplish further specification. In this 
respect, these responses treated a prior question as acceptable (though not explicitly 
confirmable) but insufficiently specific (Stivers & Hayashi, 2010). In contrast, adjusting 
answers did not clearly treat a prior question as asking about something else. Rather, they 
functioned to adjust aspects of descriptions within questions and to assert callers’ primary 
epistemic rights and entitlements to knowledge.  
Reality construction and discursive psychology 
 Discursive psychology has focused on the different ways that people construct and 
manage versions of reality (Potter, 1996). Research on reality construction began by studying 
talk, primarily in interview contexts (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and monologic forms such as 
political speeches (Rapley, 1998), or in texts (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Such research also 
often focused on the rhetorical or argumentative function of reality construction (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992). For example, Potter (1996) documented the rhetorical practices that individuals 
could use to undermine other peoples’ constructions of reality by emphasizing their personal 
interest, or stake, in the matter (e.g. “you would say that”).  
This thesis did not examine the persuasive or rhetorical nature of reality construction. 
Rather, the thesis documents the interactional and sequential nature of reality construction in 
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talk-in-interaction. The analysis highlights the role of question-answer sequences as a place 
for the joint accomplishment of reality construction. For example, declarative request for 
confirmation sequences were crucial for jointly establishing the facts of the complaint. In 
some sequences involving adjusting answers, there was an inconsistency in the versions of 
reality produced by callers and conciliators, whereby the question constructed one version of 
reality to be agreed upon and the response adjusted the prior description in some way and 
thus re-constructed the version of reality.  
Discursive psychology has long noted that knowledge is relevant to reality 
construction (Edwards & Potter, 1992). For example, early work in discursive psychology 
highlighted that people who are members of certain social categories are entitled to know 
certain things, and that these entitlements can be mobilised in order to legitimate or 
undermine versions of reality (Potter, 1996; Rapley, 1998). A contribution this thesis makes 
is to draw together conversation analytic work on epistemics and discursive psychological 
work on reality construction to show that epistemic stance, rights and entitlements can be 
implicated in constructing versions of reality.  
Telephone-mediated helpline services 
 Conversation analysis and discursive psychology have provided an extensive 
understanding of how telephone helpline service interactions are accomplished in situ 
(Hepburn, Wilkinson, & Butler, 2014). In particular, such research has shown how epistemic 
matters are relevant for accomplishing various institutional tasks (e.g. Butler et al., 2010).  
The present thesis contributes to that by showing that speakers treated epistemic rights and 
entitlements as relevant for accomplishing the institutional task of jointly establishing the 
facts of a complaint.  
 The thesis forms part of an emerging research base on dispute resolution helpline 
services. It provides further evidence of some of the interactional practices used to 
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accomplish dispute resolution in situ (e.g. Weatherall, 2015; Weatherall & Stubbe, 2015). 
Previous research on interaction in dispute resolution has been broadly theoretical in focus 
(Glenn & Kuttner, 2013). In contrast, a valuable contribution of conversation analytic 
research, and by extension this thesis, is to provide an interactional lens to show how dispute 
resolution actually gets accomplished. 
Evaluation of research and future directions 
 The analytic work of the thesis provided an understanding of epistemic matters at 
particular moments in calls to a dispute resolution helpline service. However, previous 
research has shown that epistemic matters are not necessarily static in conversation. For 
example, Mondada (2011) showed that speakers’ epistemic positioning (i.e. their stances and 
statuses) were dynamic across a single episode of talk-in-interaction. An important 
conclusion from that study is that epistemic stance, status and asymmetry can be revised and 
re-established by speakers throughout an interaction. Therefore, the focus on a specific 
sequence meant that the present research did not consider the temporal nature of epistemic 
matters in these interactions. Future research might ask questions such as, what other actions 
or sequences in these interactions involve speakers contesting epistemic rights and how do 
callers and conciliators re-negotiate and re-establish their epistemic stances and asymmetries 
across an interaction? 
 The present thesis only investigated answers to declarative requests for confirmation, 
which followed the extensive research on responses that adjust or ‘resist’ aspects of prior 
questions (e.g. Stivers, 2005; Stivers & Hayashi, 2010). Focusing on the answers was 
beneficial because it allowed an insight into how different formats managed callers’ 
epistemic rights in different ways, which lead to the unique analytic finding of the response 
continuum.  
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 However, the emphasis on responses raises some important analytic questions about 
the declarative questions. For example, how did conciliators gain an understanding of the 
detail to be established and why were the matters in the declarative questions presented as 
shared knowledge? One analytic observation provides a possible answer to these questions. 
Specifically, “So” prefacing was a regular feature of the declarative questions in the 
collection, and this displayed that a question was based on an inference available from some 
prior talk (c.f. Heritage & Watson, 1979). This observation raises the possibility that “so” 
prefacing could be a systematic way for conciliators to display their limited entitlement to the 
knowledge claimed.  
 The narrow analytic focus provided a unique understanding of the sequential 
accomplishment of reality construction. However, the details being agreed upon in the 
request for confirmation sequences only constituted parts of broader complaints. In other 
words, examining sequences in isolation was problematic because the entire call was a 
process of collaboratively constructing the complaint as a version of reality. Furthermore, the 
calls examined in the thesis were only one part of a wider process of reality construction. An 
investigation of the other aspects of the reality construction process could be a fruitful 
direction for research. For example, another part of the process is the subsequent interactions 
between the conciliator and the caller’s electricity provider where further details are gathered 
and existing information is verified. These interactions may involve the collaborative re-
construction of the complaint through verifying or challenging the initial version of reality 
constructed by the caller and conciliator.  
 In institutional interaction, “the goals of the participants are more limited and 
institution-specific” compared to everyday interaction (Heritage, 2005, p. 104).  As such, the 
actions being accomplished in institutional talk are likely more defined and specific than in 
mundane interaction because they are produced with an orientation to a particular 
 73 
 
institutional framework (Heritage & Clayman, 2010). Therefore, examining this particular 
institutional setting allowed a clear grasp and understanding of the actions being 
accomplished in declarative request for confirmation sequences.  
However, studying a single institution could mean that some of the findings may not 
be generalizable to other dispute resolution helpline services or even other institutional 
settings. For example, would it be the case in other dispute resolution services that declarative 
request for confirmation sequences are an important place where epistemic rights are 
contested? Also, would the response continuum found in this thesis be generalizable to other 
institutional settings? The presence of cases from a second related institution (EWOV) 
provides some initial evidence for the generalizability of the findings to other dispute 
resolution helpline services. The generality of the findings could be established by examining 
declarative request for confirmation sequences in other settings and in mundane conversation, 
where their functions and actions may not be so clear.  
Practical applications 
  One question that is not addressed by the present research is what constitutes 
effective dispute resolution? The analytic work identified various interactional practices used 
to accomplish an institutional task in the interactions. However, the thesis did not explore 
what practical recommendations could be made to improve the dispute resolution process. 
Further work is needed to develop recommendations for the communication training of 
conciliators. 
 The Conversation Analytic Role-play Method (CARM) is a recently developed 
program for workplace communication training (Stokoe, 2014). It utilises a conversation 
analytic approach to provide training that is based on empirically grounded findings and 
materials from naturally occurring, as opposed to simulated, interaction (Stokoe, 2013a). The 
main aim of CARM is to identify examples of interactional problems or “roadblocks” in 
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institutional interaction and to provide effective practices to resolve these problems (Stokoe, 
2014, p.256). For example, Stokoe (2013b) studied calls to a helpline service that offered free 
mediation services to the public. An interactional problem was callers not taking up the 
mediation services that were offered to them. Further research by Sikveland and Stokoe 
(2016) documented the practices speakers used to deal with this problem in situ. It was found 
that when call-takers asked if mediation would be “helpful”, it was less effective in eliciting 
uptake of services than if callers were asked whether they would be “willing” to undertake 
mediation. Sikveland and Stokoe recommended that call-takers be trained to use the latter 
practice in their calls.  
 At this stage, further work would be needed to identify specific roadblocks in calls to 
the EGCC. For example, the organization could be consulted in order to identify any 
interactional issues that could be dealt with more effectively. Further work would need to 
collect another corpus of calls, identify any interactional issues and then analyse how they are 
managed effectively and ineffectively. These findings would then be presented to the 
organization in the form of a CARM workshop (Stokoe, 2014). A CARM workshop with the 
EGCC would involve presenting recordings of the calls alongside the accompanying 
transcripts. The transcripts and recordings would be presented line by line and stopped at the 
first turn of the interactional trouble, at which point the employees would discuss what they 
would do, or what they think would happen, next (Stokoe, 2014). The next turn would then 
be played to show how the problem was actually dealt with. It is from these empirical 
findings of how the interactional problems are dealt with in situ that recommendations for 
training practices would be drawn and provided to the EGCC.   
 Future research collaborations with the EGCC are currently being considered, one 
option of which is the practical application of CARM following the steps described above. 
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Such an approach would allow the identification of effective practices that could be used to 
inform any future training of conciliators at the EGCC. 
Concluding comments 
This thesis is situated within a wider intellectual project to understand knowledge. 
Drawing inspiration from the approach of situated cognition and using discursive psychology 
and conversation analysis, this thesis took knowledge ‘out of the head’ and examined it as it 
was made relevant by speakers in the socially situated setting of telephone-mediated dispute 
resolution. The empirical work of the thesis highlighted that who was entitled and obligated 
to know something was an important normative dynamic in these interactions. Further, the 
analysis demonstrated that territories of knowledge, the issues of who knew what and who 
had the rights to know it, were managed and contested by speakers in situ. The thesis 
highlighted the practical nature of knowledge and reality construction in talk-in-interaction. It 
showed that knowledge and reality construction were reflexively tied to a key institutional 
task in telephone-mediated dispute resolution. It is clear that the search for what knowledge 
is, and its implications for social interaction does not end with this thesis. However, it is 
hoped that this research spurs further investigation into how knowledge is made relevant and 
deployed for practical purposes by participants in talk-in-interaction.  
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Appendix A 
Transcript formatting 
Extracts of transcript were presented throughout the thesis. A typical example is shown 
below.  
Extract A.1: 
EGCC2015-010 
01 CON:   .hh and so this is in regards to y- thee  
02         electricity: (0.2) supply at your home? 
03        (0.5) 
04 CAL:   .hh yes.  
 
Each extract was numbered and given a code. The code identified which corpus the 
transcript was taken from; the EGCC corpora collected in 2015 or 2008, or the EWOV 
corpus. The latter part of the code identified which file from the particular corpus the extract 
was taken from. Every line of the transcript was given a number for ease of reference. Each 
speaker was given a three letter identifier, where CON referred to the conciliator and CAL 
referred to the caller.  The talk of each respective speaker was presented following these 
identifiers. The lines of interest were indicated in boldface
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Appendix B 
Conversation analytic transcription conventions 
Conversation analysis transcribes talk-in-interaction using the notation and conventions 
developed by Gail Jefferson. The following table presents the transcription conventions used 
in the extracts throughout the thesis.  
 
Tables B1-B3 (Adapted from Hepburn, 2004 and Jefferson, 2004): 
 
Temporal and Sequential Notation 
Notation Description 
[ Overlap onset: where two (or more) 
speakers begin talking at once. 
] Overlap offset: the end of overlapping talk. 
CON:        word= 
CAL:        =word 
Equals signs indicate no pauses between 
speakers’ turns. 
CON:        word=word Equals signs within same turn indicates no 
silence between words, a rush-through in 
speech. 
(.) A micropause, less than two tenths of a 
second. 
(0.5), (1.4) Silences timed to tenths of a second. 
  
Characteristics of Speech Delivery  
Notation Description 
Wo:rd Upward intonation contour, sound moves 
down-to-up. 
Wo:rd Downward intonation contour, sound moves 
up-to-down. 
Wo::::rd Extension of prior sound. The more colons, 
the longer the extension. 
Wor- Sound cut-off. 
. Falling intonation. 
? Rising intonation. 
, Slight rise in intonation. 
¿ Rising intonation that is in between a 
question mark and comma. 
word Emphasis or stress on part of a word. 
WOrd Capital letters indicate louder talk (louder 
than simple emphasis). 
◦word◦ Words enclosed by degree signs are spoken 
quietly 
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◦◦word◦◦ Words enclosed by double degree signs are 
spoken even quieter. 
↑ Shift to a higher pitch. 
↓ Shift to a lower pitch. 
£word£ Words enclosed by pound signs are spoken 
in a “smiling” voice 
#word# Words enclosed by hash signs are spoken 
with a “creaky” voice. 
>word< Indicates a portion of talk that is quicker 
relative to that surrounding it. 
<word> Indicates a portion of talk that is slower 
relative to that surrounding it. 
<word Indicates talk that is begun quicker than 
expected or jump-started. 
.hhhhhh Audible inhalation. The more h’s the longer 
the inhalation. 
hhhhhh Audible exhalation. The more h’s the longer 
the exhalation. 
wohhrd Italic h’s indicate breathiness within a word. 
hah, hih and variants Indicate laughter tokens. Each token 
represents a single ‘beat’ of laughter. 
Tokens are transcribed as they sound 
phonetically.  
Wo(h)rd Interpolated particles of aspiration. Laughter 
or plosive aspiration occurring within a 
word. 
.snih Sniffing. 
 
Transcriber Descriptions 
Notation Description 
(word word word) Transcriber’s best guess as to what was said. 
(word/word) Transcriber’s provision of two potential 
hearings. 
(            ) Transcriber unsure as to what was said. 
((Receiver lifted)) Double brackets indicate transcriber 
comments or interpretation of something 
they hear that is not talk.  
 
 
  
 90 
 
Appendix C 
Information sheet and consent form provided to conciliators 
 
Information Sheet to Conciliators 
 
Office of the Electricity and Gas Complaints Commissioner Scheme 
 
David Edmonds Dr Ann Weatherall  
Masters student 
School of Psychology 
Reader, School of Psychology  
Victoria University of Wellington Victoria University of Wellington  
Email: david.edmonds@vuw.ac.nz Email: ann.weatherall@vuw.ac.nz  
 Phone:  4635211  
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
 
The aim of this project is to develop an understanding of interactions in phone calls to the  
Office of the Electricity and Gas Complaints Commissioner Scheme (The Office).  A focus is 
the way in which the telephone service actually operates – with a view to being able to 
specify what kinds of practices are most effective in providing the best possible support for 
callers.    The analyses of the recordings aim to answer questions such as:  
 
 What are the kinds of issues or matters that callers bring up during the course of a 
call? 
 When are issues other than complaints brought up in the calls? 
 How do callers present their problems - and how do conciliators respond to them? 
 How – if at all – do conciliators draw on their own experience? 
 What kinds of information are offered - and how are they received? 
 
Who is conducting the research? 
 
 The project is for a Master’s thesis through Victoria University of Wellington. This 
research has been approved by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee under 
delegated authority of Victoria University of Wellington’s Human Ethics Committee. 
 
What is involved if you agree to participate? 
 
 If you agree to participate in this study you will be asked to record the calls you handle as 
part of your work for Office of the Electricity and Gas Complaints Commissioner Scheme. 
 You will be required to seek permission for recording from the other participant in each 
conversation (see instructions). 
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 Recordings will continue until we have a sample of calls that seems to represent the range 
of matters dealt with by Office of the Electricity and Gas Complaints Commissioner 
Scheme. 
 The researchers will transcribe the calls.  The transcripts and the recordings are the data for 
the study. 
 You are free to stop recording your calls at any stage of the research. 
 You can decide if there are any calls you would not like included in the research.  
 The researchers will ask you to confirm the calls to be included in the study when they 
transfer them to their storage devices. 
 Your participation in this project will have no impact on job evaluation or other issues 
relating to your employment. 
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
 
 Your consent forms and the data will be safely archived indefinitely at Victoria University 
of Wellington. 
 Any identifying information will be removed from the transcripts. 
 Any identifying information in the recordings of the calls will be removed as much as 
possible by editing it out. 
 Your data will not be used by Office of the Electricity and Gas Complaints Commissioner 
Scheme to assess job performance. 
 In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and professional 
organizations, your data may be shared with other competent researchers. 
 Your data may be used in other, related studies. 
 A copy of the data (with all identifying information removed) will remain in the custody of 
the researchers at their respective locations (i.e. Victoria University of Wellington). 
 Any transcripts used for training purposes will be anonymous and not identify conciliators 
 
What happens to the information that you provide? 
 
 The data you provide may be included in publications to scientific journals, presentations 
at scientific conferences and/or used for teaching or training.   
 
The study will result in a report that you will be given a copy of.  We will also run a workshop 
at Office of the Electricity and Gas Complaints Commissioner Scheme which will give 
feedback about the calls.  
 
If you have any further questions regarding this study please contact any one of us above. 
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Statement of consent 
 
I have read the information about this research and any questions I wanted to ask have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I agree to participate in this research.  
 
I understand that my calls will be recorded and that I need to gain the consent from callers 
before recording a call. 
  
I understand that I can stop recording my calls at any time and I can indicate to the researchers 
any calls I do not want included in the research. 
 
 
Name: __________________________________ 
 
 
Signature: __________________________________ 
 
 
Date:  __________________________________ 
 
 
Copy to:  
[a] participant,  
[b] researcher (initial both copies below)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
